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I.

Introduction

V.

"[F]ingerprints never lie," was the statement of lain McKie, a
retired Scottish police officer, a thirty year veteran in law enforcement, and
the father of Detective Shirley McKie. But when his daughter's fingerprint
was unexplainably linked to a murder scene, and she was arrested and
charged with perjury, Mr. McKie, for the first time, questioned the
reliability of fingerprint evidence. He went on to say in an interview in
2002: "I love my daughter very much. But when they said the print was
Shirley's I have to admit I assumed the worst. My entire career I had heard
that fingerprints never lie."' If it is the understanding of a seasoned law
how do
enforcement officer that fingerprints could never be wrong,
2
average jurors perceive the reliability of fingerprint evidence?
If truth be told, "everyone ' 3 believes that fingerprint evidence is
reliable, even infallible, evidence. In the average layman's understanding
of criminal law, fingerprint identification evidence is equated with guilt,
while the lack of fingerprint identification evidence infers a weakness in
the prosecution's case. 4 The media portrays fingerprint evidence as

1. Michael Specter, Do FingerprintsLie?; The Golden Standard of Forensic Evidence Is Now
Being Challenged,THE NEW YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 96.
2. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF

EXPERT TESTIMONY §27-1.0, at 347 (2d ed. 2002)("[M]ost, if not all, claims made by or on behalf of
fingerprint examiners enjoy widespread and unquestioning belief among the lay public, including the
bench and the bar.").
3. "Everyone" refers to lay knowledge and common interpretation. It is important because it
plays into jury bias, irrespective of any potential testimony or limiting instruction given to the jury. If it
is commonly understood that fingerprints are inherently reliable and the best evidence of identity, the
jury will nonetheless be biased in favor of the prosecution and likely to nullify or ignore defense
challenges to this form of evidence.
4. But see FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-2.2.4, at 384. Although the presence of a positive
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incontrovertible and reliable. Television shows such as Law & Order, The
Practice,CSI, NYPD Blue, and movies endorse the reliability of fingerprint
evidence. Every jailhouse lawyer would agree that if the accused's
fingerprint is found on the murder weapon, the outcome will most likely be
a "slam dunk" for the prosecution. It would not even be a close case. If
the fingerprints match, what else is there to talk about?
That is the common understanding of fingerprint identification
evidence among law enforcement experts, police and prosecutors, and
laypeople. In fact, Professor Saks notes that until recently "virtually every
technique offered to courts by forensic scientists for the purpose of linking
suspects to crimes, including fingerprints, was accepted - not only without
question, but without challenge."5 In the everyday practice of criminal law
it is not an overstatement to define the acceptance of fingerprint evidence
as universal.
As author of this Article, I believe it is relevant to disclose my
practical experience in criminal law and exposure to fingerprint
identification evidence. I was a state prosecutor in Clark County, Las
Vegas, Nevada for six years, 1996-2002. In that capacity, I observed
fingerprint identification evidence being used in a variety of ways by law
enforcement and the prosecution. During my time as a prosecutor,
however, I was never involved with a case nor ever heard about a case in
my jurisdiction in which the fingerprint evidence was challenged. From
my practical experience and scholarly research of the topic, the reliability
of fingerprint identification evidence routinely goes unquestioned at all
levels of the criminal process and by both sides of the litigation,
prosecution and defense.
Although the criminal justice system relies on fingerprint
identification evidence at various phases of the process, this Article focuses
on the use of fingerprints in jury trials, 6 specifically the opinion testimony
of the latent print examiners who analyze the latent fingerprints found at
crime scenes and opine whether those prints match the accused. It is only
through the expert opinion testimony of a latent print examiner that

fingerprint identification may be strong inculpatory evidence for the prosecution's case, the lack of
fingerprint evidence has little evidentiary value. "The absence of fingerprints does not indicate that a
person did not touch the item or surface with their exposed fingers. Whether or not fingerprints are left
depends on the condition of the surface, the condition of the fingers, and the dynamics of touching." Id.
5. Michael J. Saks, Book Review, 43 JURIMJ 141 (2002).
6. Although it is important to ensure the accuracy of fingerprint identification evidence at all
stages of the process, jury trial is the accused's primary opportunity to challenge or refute the evidence
against him. Since his ability to preclude the prosecution's latent print expert witness from testifying or,
alternatively, to present his own counter-expert witness is most acute at trial, the real battle occurs
during the trial phase.

4
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fingerprint identification evidence is presented to the jury. For example, a
fingerprint examiner's opinion that a latent fingerprint 7 found on the
murder weapon "matches"8 the accused is commonly understood to be
conclusive evidence of guilt. Yet, does anyone ask about the accuracy rate
of the examiner? Or even the average accuracy rate of his profession? Has
fingerprint evidence ever been wrong? 9
Although seldom detected, fingerprint identification evidence has
been wrong.' 0 As a point of departure, this Article will present the shocking
7. Latent fingerprints are fingerprints that are invisible under normal viewing conditions but are
made visible by fingerprint powder or other chemical processes. Appendix I, at 38-39.
8. United States v. Llera Plaza (Plaza1), 179 F. Supp. 2d at 497 ("A fingerprint examiner's job
consists of comparing latent and rolled fingerprints to determine if the person who left the latent prints
can be identified."). A common comparison method used is the ACE-V fingerprint examination process
employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (USA), Scottish Criminal Record Office (Scotland),
and New Scotland Yard (UK). ACE-V is "an acronym for the four articulated steps in fingerprint
examination: Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification." FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-2.4
Appendix I, at 397.
9. There are two ways in which the fingerprint evidence could be wrong: 1)forgery or planting of
fingerprints or 2) misidentification by the latent print examiner. Although forgery is technically
possible, according to the experts, fingerprint forgery requires an unusual amount of specific
knowledge and skill. Thus, although forgery or planting prints has occurred, as a practical matter it is
extremely rare. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-2.3.5, at 392; See generally Pat A. Wertheim, Detection of
Forged or FabricatedLatent Prints, 44 J. FORENSIC IDENT. 652 (1994); Pat A. Wertheim, Integrity
Assurance: Policies and Procedures to Prevent Fabricationof Latent Print Evidence, 48 J. FORENSIC
IDENT. 431 (1998). This Article, however, focuses exclusively on the possible misidentification of
latent fingerprints and the evidentiary debate regarding the scientific validity of the methodology and
standards employed by latent fingerprint experts.
10. See Justine Redman, Man Wrongly Linked to Madrid Bombing Sues, CNN.com, International,
October 5, 2004 available at http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/0/04/Mayfield.lawsuit/index.html
("Brandon Mayfield, a lawyer in Portland, Oregon, wrongly detained in connection with the
investigation of March's deadly train bombings in Madrid, Spain, files suit Monday against the Justice
Department and FBI."); Jennifer Mnookin, The Achilles' Heel of Fingerprints, The Washington Post,
May 29, 2004 at A27 ("Three highly skilled FBI fingerprint experts matched a partial print found on a
bag in Madrid that contained explosive detonators. U.S. officials called it 'absolutely incontrovertible'
and a 'bingo match.' [Based on the fingerprint identification evidence] Mayfield was promptly taken
into custody as a material witness. [Later] the FBI admitted that it goofed; the print actually belongs to
[a different person], Ouhname Daoud, an Algerian." Mayfield's case is notable not only because of the
initially erroneous analysis but also because the FBI identified 15 points of similarity to support their
conclusion that the fingerprints matched. Additionally, the Spanish authorities found 8 points of
similarity in the prints. "While many American examiners no longer exclusively count points[of
similarity], experts have declared positive fingerprint matched in court after finding even fewer than
eight points."). See also CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 60 Minutes, Fingerprints: Infallible Evidence,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/16/60minutes/main563607.shtml (60 Minutes
report on the fingerprint misidentification and wrongful conviction of Richard Jackson). Mr. Jackson
was convicted of murder, in Upper Darby, Pennsylvania. He was sentenced and served two years in
prison before fingerprint misidentification and examiner error was confirmed. After many appeals and
because of Mr. Jackson's sheer persistence and perseverance regarding his innocence, the state
prosecutor re-submitted the fingerprint evidence (which had originally been tested by local police
officers) to the FBI for re-testing. The FBI discovered the error, which led to Jackson's release from
prison and exoneration of the charges. See also Simon Cole, FingerprintsNot Infallible, NAT'L L.J.,
February 23, 2004, at 22. In February 2004, in Massachusetts, Stephan Cowans' shooting conviction,
which was based largely on fingerprint identification, was overturned because of DNA testing that
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facts of Detective Shirley McKie's case, in which the fingerprint analysis
was wrong. Detective McKie was forced to single-handedly prove her own
innocence by demonstrating fingerprint misidentification. 1 Even more
troubling is the revelation of the forensic community's unwillingness to
acknowledge its own errors. It is common in most jurisdictions, that
fingerprint identification evidence is assumed to be scientifically valid and
free from errors. Judges routinely admit the expert opinion testimony of
latent print examiners without a pause.
Some defense attorneys like Robert Epstein, a federal public
defender in Philadelphia, are no longer taking fingerprint examiners at face
value and are instead challenging the basis of their conclusions.' 2 Defense
attorneys are arguing for a rigorous application of the Daubert-Kumho
standard 3 and exposing a lack of scientific validity behind the
methodology used by forensic examiners who test fingerprints. These

exonerated him. Mr. Cowans spent more than six years in prison and of the 141 individuals exonerated
by DNA evidence is the first to have been wrongly convicted based on fingerprint evidence.
We are left with the question of whether fingerprint evidence is totally
shoddy. The answer is: of course not. DNA exonerations have exposed a
lot more bad serology and bad microscopic hair comparison than bad
fingerprint evidence. In fact, post-conviction DNA testing has exposed
more bad DNA evidence than bad fingerprint evidence. Id.
See also Jennifer L. Mnookin, A Blow to the Credibilityof FingerprintEvidence, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
February 2, 2004, at A14 ("DNA tests on clothing left near the crime scene and on a saliva specimen
from the glass did not match Cowan's DNA. The prosecution still insisted it had the right guy - after
all, his fingerprint was on the glass. But when that fingerprint was reanalyzed by experts, it turned out
not to match Cowans after all."). See discussion infra Section II. (A specific case in Scotland exposes
the fallibility of fingerprint identification evidence.); see also News Wrap, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
http://www.lvrj.com/lvjhome/2002/Sep-18-Wedat
available
18,
2002
September
2002/news/19657743.html. (Kathleen Hatfield's fingerprints were misidentified and she was wrongly
thought to have been murdered in Las Vegas. Kathleen, a resident of Santa Rosa, CA, is in reality alive
and well. "Las Vegas police had mistakenly matched the [her] fingerprints.., with those of a
decomposed woman's body found in June in the desert east of Las Vegas." According to Lt. Tom
Monahan of the Metropolitan Police Department Homicide Section, "[t]here's no question. A mistake
was made."). See also Michael Coit, Santa Rosa Woman Identified As Vegas Slaying Victim Turns Up
Alive, THE PRESS DEMOCRAT, September 13, 2002, at Al.
11. See infra Section lII. The sad and frightening reality of Detective McKie's injustice is that the
"ordinary accused," meaning someone who is not a law enforcement officer, would never be able to
right the wrong of this type of forensic error - a sobering thought that haunts all members of the legal
community who strive to seek justice and ensure fairness in the jury trial process.
12. Robert Epstein was the first defense attorney to file a challenge to fingerprint identification
evidence. See United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002)(defense motion denied),
aff'd, United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). Mitchell was the companion case that
preceded Plaza I, wherein Epstein filed a similar challenge to the use of fingerprint identification
evidence on behalf of the defendant Plaza. See United States v. Llera Plaza (Plaza 1), 179 F. Supp. 2d
492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002). The defense motion in Plaza I was ultimately denied by the court's
decision in Plaza If. Cf United States v. Llera Plaza (Plaza II), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13,
2002) (vacating and superceding the prior decision upon reconsideration).
13. See discussion infra Section IV (explaining Daubert-Kumho standard).
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attorneys are demanding proof that the opinions of expert fingerprint
examiners are as reliable as the forensic community purports them to be.
In other words, is it ipse dixitl 4 ? Or is there scientific validity to
the supposition that fingerprints do not lie? Currently, the assumption that
latent fingerprint evidence is one hundred percent accurate in determining
an individual's identity is a fact that neither science nor law can prove with
any certainty because the question has never been posed 1 5 or empirically
studied. 16 Because of this lack of certainty regarding the accuracy of the
evidence, the defense bar seeks to exclude fingerprint identification
evidence as entirely unreliable. The concept may sound outlandish, but
there is substance to this evidentiary challenge.
The ultimate merit of the defense's argument lies, however, in its
advocacy for a meticulous application of the Daubert-Kumho standard to
fingerprint identification evidence rather than in its request for complete
exclusion of fingerprint evidence. This Article rejects the blanket assertion
that fingerprint analysis is merely an "unfounded creation of law
enforcement fingerprint examiners,', 17 but instead seeks to critically
analyze the use of fingerprint identification evidence in jury trials by both
the prosecution and defense. It therefore explores the difficult question:
14. See General Electric Company v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("But nothing in either
Daubert or in the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is
connected to existing data only by ipse dixit of the expert."). Ipse dixit is a Latin phrase defined as an
assertion made but not proven. MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, available at http://www.merriamwebster.com.
15. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-1.0, at 348 ("Many of the most basic claims of fingerprint
identification have never been tested empirically, and the field's most thoughtful research and
scholarship have concluded that, in the strong form in which they are usually presented, those claims in
fact are unprovable.").
16. Id. at §27.1.2.11[l], 44 [Pocket Part]. In Plaza I, "while there were 'numerous writings that
discuss the fingerprint identification techniques employed by fingerprint examiners', none of them
tested the technique's dependability. Reviewing all of the proponent's submissions, the court noted that,
"the government had little success in identifying scientific testing that tended to establish the reliability
of fingerprint identifications." See id. at §27-1.0, 347. "[Slurprisingly little conventional science exists
to support the claims of the fingerprint examination community." Even the National Institute of
Justice's Fingerprint Advisory Panel, comprised of "latent print examiners, researchers, and senior
administrators from Federal, State, and private forensic science laboratories," has acknowledged the
lack of scientific study supporting the opinions of fingerprint identification experts and has "reached a
consensus that the field needs .. . [b]asic research to determine the scientific validity of individualityin
friction ridge examination, [that is, fingerprint identification]." See generally JEREMY TRAVIS,
NATIONAL

INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,

FORENSIC

FRICTION

RIDGE

(FINGERPRINT)

EXAMINATION

VALIDATION STUDIES (March 2000) available at http://www.latent-prints.com/NIJ.htm.
17. Robert Epstein, FingerprintsMeet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint "Science" Is Revealed,
75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 607 (2002). Epstein overstates the problem with fingerprint identification
evidence and offers only the drastic solution of exclusion, which unfairly prejudices the interest of the
state. In other words, in an effort to eliminate the unfair bias against the defendant, Epstein merely
shifts the unfairness to the prosecution by advocating for blanket exclusion of fingerprint analysis.
Complete exclusion of fingerprint identification evidence further undermines the public confidence in
the criminal justice system and the jury trial process. See discussion infra Section IV. E.
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whether latent fingerprint identification experts are reliable and whether the
methodology used by forensic science satisfies the current evidentiary
standards. Specifically, it queries whether it is appropriate to allow latent
fingerprint expert witnesses to testify regarding their findings which are
purported to conclusively link an accused to a crime. Finally, the Article
examines in what ways and under what circumstances the defense should
be allowed to refute this evidence before the jury, assuming the trial judge
allows the fingerprint expert to testify.1 8
Part II of this Article explains in more detail what a fingerprint is
it is used in criminal litigation. Part III provides a real life
how
and
example of how fingerprint misidentification might go undetected. Part III
also exposes the reality that, even when this type of forensic error is
discovered, it is difficult to prove and nearly impossible to get law
enforcement to admit. Part IV dissects the Daubert-Kumho evidentiary
standard for expert witnesses and articulates the main arguments currently
being used to challenge the expert opinion testimony of latent fingerprint
examiners who proffer fingerprint identification evidence. It illuminates
the significant issues that must be considered by the "gatekeeper" when
determining whether to admit or exclude an expert's opinion. Part IV
further explains why no federal courts have yet excluded fingerprint
identification evidence as unreliable.
Mindful that the ultimate goal of a jury trial is to preserve fairness
and due process while simultaneously seeking justice, i.e., a search for the
truth, this Article comments on the manner and method in which a party
should be allowed to attack evidence and present countervailing theories
that support each side's respective version of the facts. In light of this
specific objective, Part V seeks to resolve the adversarial debate between
prosecutors and defenders regarding the use of fingerprint identification
evidence in criminal jury trials.

is quite rare for a trial judge to preclude the prosecution's
18. Id. at 606, n.7. The reality is that 'it
fingerprint expert from testifying regarding the identity of the latent prints found at the crime scene."
See also Legal Challenges to Fingerprints,at http://onin.com/fp/daubert-links.html (last updated May
7, 2004) for a list of recent cases wherein the issue of fingerprint evidence exclusion was litigated. See
generally United States v. Llera Plaza (Plaza 1), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated
and superceded upon reconsiderationby United States v. Llera Plaza (Plaza I1), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002); United States v. Parks (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 1991) (No. CR-91-358-JSL)
(limiting the ability of the prosecution's latent fingerprint expert's testimony.) Neither decision is
binding authority for the exclusion of fingerprint identification evidence.

8
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II.

What Is Fingerprint Evidence and How Is It Used in Criminal
Litigation

A.

Known vs. Latent Fingerprints

When thinking about fingerprint evidence, one image that may
come to mind is a suspect's hand being dipped into ink and pressed onto
paper to record the unique ridges of his or her fingertips.' 9 Although many
fingerprints are collected in this manner, the above image explains only
one type of fingerprint evidence that is used in criminal law. Fingerprint
evidence encompasses a more complex set of issues far beyond the
standard jailhouse booking information.2 ° One must first consider the
various ways in which the criminal justice system utilizes fingerprint
evidence in order to fully understand the defense bar's challenge to the use
of fingerprint identification evidence at trial.

19. Although the traditional ink and roll method is still used in many jurisdictions, a more
modem method involves using "Livescan," an inkless optical scanner. See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 76 (2001).

20. The origin of fingerprint identification was to keep track of criminals and prevent them from
evading capture or punishment when using aliases. The uniqueness and permanence of fingerprints
makes it impossible for criminals to disguise their identities. Remember that the successful part of the
Mitchell experiment was the ability to accurately identify suspects when comparing their full set of
rolled prints to the database of other full set rolled prints. This type of identification is still an important
function in the criminal justice system, particularly for extradition and sentencing purposes. When an
individual is arrested, it is crucial to identify whether the individual is "wanted" and to quickly and
accurately know the individual's prior and pending criminal history. A reliable and consistent
identification system is imperative in order to avoid chaos. See Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (citing
generally COLIN BEAVAN, FINGERPRINTS (2001)):

HistoricalNote (not drawn from testimony): 'Galton points' take their name
from Francis Galton.... Starting in the late 1880s, Galton undertook to
appropriate much of, and then build upon, the pioneering fingerprint
identification efforts of (1) another Englishman, William Herschel, serving in
the Indian civil service, and (2) Henry Faulds, a Scottish physician serving as
a medicalmissionary in Japan. Galton's efforts were brought into mainstream
of criminal investigation by Edward Henry, the Inspector General of Police in
Bengal, who, in 1901, was called back to England as Assistant Commissioner
(later, Commissioner) of Scotland Yard and promptly established the Yard's
Fingerprint Branch. Galton and Henry have customarily been celebrated as the
principal progenitors of f'mgerprint identification, with Herschel given an
approving nod - while the foundational work of Faulds has, until very
recently, been largely ignored.
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It is generally accepted 21 that fingerprints themselves are unique
and permanent identifiers. There are no two people who have the same
fingerprints, not even twins. 23 The center of the current legal debate,
however, is not the physiology of fingerprints, i.e., the uniqueness or
permanence of the mark, nor is the criminal defense bar challenging the
comparisons conducted on full sets of known fingerprints. 24 Instead, the
issue is whether fingerprint examiners can accurately and conclusively
determine the identity of an incriminating latent print found at a crime
scene. 25 This section will distinguish between fingerprint evidence used
21. Cf FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27.1.211 [1][Pocket Part], at 42. Professor Faigman questions
whether there is a "high degree of indisputability" in the uniqueness of fingerprints and criticizes Judge
Pollak for taking judicial notice of this fact in Plaza I. See United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 252
(Consistent with Professor Faigman's aforementioned criticism of Judge Pollak's decision to take
judicial notice of the uniqueness of fingerprints, in 2004 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
analyzing the same Dauberthearing transcript that was used in Plaza I, held that it was error for
the trial court to take judicial notice of the uniqueness of fingerprints. However, the error was
found to be harmless.) See also Cole, supra note 20, at 176. Cole points out that even founders of
fingerprint identification analysis had doubts about the uniqueness of fingerprints. "[Henry Faulds] was
extremely skeptical of the use of latent fingerprints ... for forensic identification," Id. "Even Francis
Galton ... felt more comfortable with anthropometry.. .[over fingerprinting]" Id. at 92. See also
HAROLD CUMMINS & CHARLES MIDLO, FINGER PRtNTS, PALMS AND SOLES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
DERMATOGLYPHICS, 154 (1943) ... it is impossible to offer decisive proof that no two finger[prints]
bear identical patterns...").
22. Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (accepting the research and testimony of Dr. Babler as "an
adequate basis ... to take judicial notice of the permanency of fingerprints."). Dr. Babler testified to the
following conclusion regarding friction ridges during the Mitchell case's Daubert hearing: "There are
many different factors, many, many different factors that influenced the development.., of its
secondary characteristics, the minutiae, the actual shape of the ridge itself. All these are so numerous
and so individual that ... I cannot conclude anything but that each and every friction ridge and their
arrangements are individual and specific." Id. at 496. Cf United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 252
(The appeals court acknowledged the existence of a reasonable dispute regarding whether
fingerprints are permanent and unique. Based on this dispute, the appeals court ruled it was
inappropriate for "the trial court in Mitchell to take judicial notice of the uniqueness of

fingerprints."). Id.
23. Specter, supra note 1, at 99. "No two people - not even identical twins - have ever been
shown to share fingerprints. The friction ridges that cover the skin on your hands and feet are formed
by the seventeenth week in the womb; at birth they have become so deep that nothing can alter them,
not even surgery." Id.
24. Full sets of rolled or known ten-prints are maintained in law enforcement computer databases.
The FBI maintains its database, called IAFIS, Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System,
in Clarksburg, West Virginia. The Clarksburg location is the "world's largest collection of fingerprints;
on an average day, forty thousand are fed into the system." A computer algorithm compares the prints
in seconds. The accuracy rate is 99.97%. Specter, supra note 1, at 99; See FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27
Appendix I, at 397. "AFIS: These computerized databases allow retrieval fingerprint records that show
electronic codes similar to a crime scene print. The system selects candidates [i.e. suspects] for
subsequent manual comparisons by fingerprint experts." Id.
25. Identifying latent prints is a more difficult and complex task than identifying full sets of
known or rolled prints. See discussion infra Section IV.C.2 (The Mitchell experiment exposes the
different accuracy rates between the identification of known prints and the identification of latent
prints. When comparing known prints, the results were good and no error detected; however, when
latent prints were compared, the errors were remarkable. However all errors observed in the Mitchell
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solely for identity and fingerprint evidence used to solve crimes and
implicate the perpetrators of crimes. The criminal justice system utilizes
fingerprint evidence for both purposes. The recent evidentiary challenges,
however, seek to exclude fingerprint evidence that incriminates as opposed
to evidence that merely identifies.26
Fingerprints that are obtained by individuals inking their fingers
and purposefully rolling each fingertip from edge to edge onto paper are
called, "rolled" or "inked" prints because of the manner in which they are
collected.27 These prints are generally complete sets of fingerprints such
that the entire fingertip is recorded, and typically all ten fingers and both
palms. These fingerprints are also referred to as "known fingerprints"
because the identity of the maker is known when the evidence is
collected.s
experiment were false negatives, not false positives.)
26. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Navarro-Fletes, 49 Fed.
Appx. 732 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Ambriz-Vasquez, 34 Fed. Appx. 356 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909 (3d Cir.
2002); United States v. Martinez-Garduno, 31 Fed. Appx. 475 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Williams, 29 Fed. Appx. 486 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171 (4th Cit.
2001); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Merritt, Cause No.
IP01-0081-CR-01-T/F, 2002 WL 1821821 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2002); United States v. Nadurath, No.
4:02-CR-32-A, 2002 WL 1000929 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2002); United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp.
2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002), affd, United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Cruz-Rivera, Crim. No. 00-98-01 (CCC), 2002 WL 662128 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2002); United States v.
Salim, 189 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D. Kan. 2002); United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan.
2002); United States v. Reaux, Crim. Action No. 01-071 Section "R" (2), 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La.
July 31, 2001); United States v. Joseph, Crim. Action No. 99-238 Section "N," 2001 WL 515213 (E.D.
La. May 14, 2001); United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.P.R. 2001); United States
v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Unites States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C.
2000). See also Legal The Fingerprint Society, Challenges to Fingerprints (Oct. 26, 2003), at
http://www.onin.com/fp/daubertlinks.html (a periodically updated list of all the Daubert hearings
challenging fingerprints since the Mitchell case until Oct. 2003, including links to unpublished opinions
and orders).
27. Rolled or known prints are "fingerprint records of individuals... [that] have been prepared
by carefully inking a person's fingers with printing ink and rolling the fingers onto a standard '10-print'
card." FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at §27-2.1.211]. Full sets of rolled or known prints are commonly
referred to as a ten-print card and are labeled with the known identity of the maker. See COLE, supra
note 20, at 76.
28. Prints taken by the police or jailor during arrest is not the only time fingerprint evidence is
collected. Rolled, inked, or known prints (terms used interchangeably in law enforcement and criminal
law scholarship) are commonly collected from various people for a variety of reasons. The original
purpose for collecting fingerprint evidence was to keep track of the true identity of criminals for jailing
and sentencing purposes, a use that still has utility today. In addition to inmate identification, however,
full sets of fingerprints are also routinely collected for non-criminal purposes. For example, many
licensed attorneys submit fingerprint cards to their state bar. Also, doctors, realtors, law enforcement
and military personnel, as well as all bonded employees must submit fingerprint cards as part of their
employment. Fingerprint evidence contained in the national database, thus, includes the identity of
many individuals who have never been associated with, accused of, or convicted of a crime. See
generally Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated and superceded upon
reconsiderationby Plaza 11, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002).
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The second type of fingerprint that is important to criminal law is
the latent fingerprint. It is the analysis of the latent print compared to the
known print that leads police to identify criminal suspects. A latent
fingerprint is "a fingerprint that is invisible under normal viewing
Latent fingerprints are rendered visible by fingerprint
conditions.
developing methods." 29 Commonly, latent fingerprints are developed by
using fingerprint powder to make the latent print visible, but other optical
or chemical methods can be used. Crime scene investigators use
fingerprint powder, which adheres to "perspiration, oils or other extraneous
matter that has been transferred from the fingers to the surface." 30 Once
the latent print is made visible, tape is used to lift the latent print from its
original surface onto a "lift card." These lift cards are examined by
fingerprint identification experts who compare the friction ridge detail in
the latent print to the details in the known print. The typical poor quality of
is, however, in part what makes the
latent prints lifted at crime scenes
31
controversial:
them
of
analysis
[L]atent prints are usually incomplete - the average
size of a latent print is 21.7% the average size of a rolled print,
and are often distorted. Distortion is due to the manner in which
the finger comes into contact with the surface, the nature of the
surface on which the print is left, and the property of the material
and/or medium that is used to "lift" the latent print.... Rolled
fingerprints, [also called known prints], by contrast, are obtained
from known persons and are taken under controlled
circumstances. The average size of a rolled fingerprint is one
square inch.32
Both types of fingerprint evidence, known prints and latent prints, are
29. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at §27-2.4 Appendix I; See also Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 497
(citing U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, FED'L BUR. INVESTIGATION, The Science of Fingerprints:Classification

and Uses 170, wherein the FBI describes latent prints in a training manual as follows:
[T]he ridges of the fingers and palms are in intermittent contact with other
parts of the body, such as the hair and face, and with various objects, which may
leave a film of grease or moisture on the ridges [of one's fingers.] In touching an
object, the film of moisture and /or grease may be transferred to the object, thus
leaving an outline of the ridges of the fingers or palm thereon. This print is
called a latent impression, the word "latent" meaning hidden, that is, the print
many times is not readily visible.
30. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-2.4 Appendix I, at 398.
31. Opponents of the use of fingerprint identification evidence urge that there is no proof of the
accuracy of latent print analysis made from such small, partial, and imperfect samples; therefore,
defense attorneys argue that latent print experts should not be allowed to testify regarding their
conclusive findings of identity to the jury. Epstein, supranote 17, at 657.
32. Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (quoting the testimony of Meagher and Ashbaugh).
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utilized in the criminal justice system. It is important to understand how
they are used. Furthermore, the extent to which fingerprint evidence is
employed in the different phases of the criminal litigation process may not
be readily apparent to the average lay observer. Fingerprint identification
evidence is not just evidence heard by the jury at trial; instead, it is utilized
at many levels of the process. The primary uses include: 1) Warrants and
extradition. Police officers and jailors use fingerprint identification
evidence to confirm a suspect's identity and to facilitate arrest and
transport back to the appropriate jurisdiction from which he or she has fled;
2) Charging decisions. Positive and negative conclusions on fingerprint
identification evidence are evaluated to determine the strength of the case
and the appropriate charges to file; 3) Jury trials. Latent fingerprint
examiners, used as the prosecution's expert witnesses, opine as to whether
the accused's fingerprints match the fingerprints found at the crime scene;
4) Appeals. In response to post-conviction relief motions wherein the
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's
verdict, the existence of fingerprint identification evidence is used to
bolster the prosecution's argument that the jury's verdict was appropriate
and that any other alleged error at trial should be viewed as harmless error
considering the strong weight of the fingerprint identification evidence.
At certain stages of a criminal case examiners are requested to
compare complete sets of known prints to one another for warrant and
extradition purposes - in other words, solely to identify. This type of
analysis merely proves the actual identity of the individual in custody, i.e.,
simply proving "who you are." At other times, examiners are requested to
compare full sets of known prints to latent prints, which are by definition
partial and imperfect prints. The analysis of latent prints not only proves
"who you are," it also proves "where you have been." That is why latent
print analysis has been such a powerful tool in solving crimes; it has
allowed law enforcement officers to identify suspects based upon where an
alleged suspect's fingerprints are found. Latent prints found at a crime
scene, for example on the murder weapon or on the victim's body,
historically have been impossible to refute - mainly because the accused is
unable to disprove the conclusive finding of the expert's testimony. The
recent defense challenges, however, seek to exclude this type of evidence
and assert that latent fingerprint experts are not qualified to give conclusive
opinions regarding the identity of the maker of the latent prints.
A judge's decision to exclude or admit latent fingerprint evidence
is, therefore, seminal in most criminal cases. A defendant's likelihood of
success at jury trial drastically changes when the powerfully incriminating
fingerprint identification evidence is excluded. Further, exclusion has
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devastating consequences on the prosecution's case, whose evidence must
reach the heightened standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This is
why the assessment of evidentiary motions challenging fingerprint
identification evidence is far from trivial and is, instead, becoming an
important debate within criminal courtrooms across the country.
B.

Expert Opinion Testimony of Fingerprint Examiners: Evidentiary
Standards and Its Use During Trial

In 1993, the United States Supreme Court addressed the need to
better scrutinize all expert witnesses and the scientific and technical
theories they espouse.3 3 There was a concern that "junk science" or
otherwise unreliable evidence was being considered by juries and,
therefore, potentially tainting their verdicts. Also, there was confusion
among the courts regarding the correct evidentiary rules to apply to
experts. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,34 the United
States Supreme Court articulated the standard for admitting expert
scientific testimony. In a radical departure from the 1923 articulation in
Frye v. United States, 35 the Daubert court rejected the rigid Frye test, and
instead asserted a more fluid list of factors for trial judges to use. Under
Daubert, the trial judge's task is to investigate the validity of the science
upon which an expert seeks to base his or her opinions.
In a subsequent case, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,36 the United
States Supreme Court extended the applicability of the Daubert factors to
all expert witnesses, even to those who are not scientists.37 Thus, the
standards articulated in Daubert and Kumho Tire, force trial judges to
38
question the scientific validity of the factual basis of all expert opinions.
This new approach to expert opinion testimony requires judges to be the
"gatekeepers" and ultimately determine the reliability of expert opinions,
and, most importantly, the science behind the opinions. 39 The standard set

33. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
34. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
35. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923), superceded by statute as stated in Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali
Co., 921 F. Supp. 666 (1996). Frye stands for the proposition that expert opinion based on scientific
technique is inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant
scientific community. See Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming Frye as the
appropriate standard by which to judge expert witnesses). The Frye standard, however, was ultimately
replaced by the Daubert standard articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
36. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
37. Id. at 151.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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out in Daubert-Kumho is, therefore, intended to enhance the precision of
the trial court's determination of good and bad evidence - a test to decipher
reliable from unreliable expert opinion testimony and ensure each party's
ability to present a complete story of their respective cases consistent with
the requirement of the Federal Rules of Evidence that only relevant and
reliable evidence be admitted.4 °
Procedurally, latent fingerprint identification evidence is
introduced exclusively through expert witness opinion testimony. Expert
witnesses help to educate jurors by explaining complex issues, thus
enabling jurors to fully understand the evidence in order to determine its
proper meaning and appropriate weight.
Expert witnesses are,
consequently, essential because they allow parties to present a more
"complete story" of their case to the jury.
Due process requires that a defendant be allowed to present his
defense, and intertwined within the right to defend oneself is the ability to
properly explain, as well as contradict, complicated evidence to the jury.442'
As part of the adversarial process, parties present relevant hard science
and even social science evidence 43 that supports their particular theories of
the case. Both parties 44 are entitled to fairly and completely present their
cases, including all relevant theories; this right is, however, limited by the
Federal Rules of Evidence.45 Fingerprint identification evidence is one
example of where law meets science. In the criminal law context, due
process and the Federal Rules of Evidence require a certain level of

40. See generally FED. R. EVID,401 & 402.
41. See generallyU.S. CONST. amends. V & VI.
42. For example, in murder cases a medical doctor will testify as an expert witness regarding the
coroner's report and give medical evidence on the cause of death of the victim.
43. For example, in some domestic violence cases, expert witnesses in battered women's
syndrome testify regarding "the cycle of violence" and the battered woman's as well as the abuser's
mental state. See generally Alana Bowman, A Matter Of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias In
Prosecutions Of Batterers Through Expert Witness Testimony Of The Common Experiences Of
Battered Women, 2 S.Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Studies 219, 237 (1992).
44. Although much attention is focused on the rights of the accused and his or her right to a fair
trial, the prosecution is the party that carries the burden of proof and also has a right to a fair trial,
including a right to fully present its evidence. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI; See also Singer v.
United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (holding that the prosecution has an interest in producing a just
result). See also ABA STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("The duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
45. The evidentiary analysis contained in this Article is focused on the Federal Rules of Evidence
and federal case law which interprets them, i.e., FRE Rule 702 vis-A-vis Daubert and Kumho Tire.
Although many state courts follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, they are not required to, and some
states have unique departures from the rules in specific areas. This Article is not intended to comment
on state-specific evidence rules, particularly those states that follow the Frye standard for expert
witnesses.
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scientific validity before a fingerprint examiner's expert opinion and
conclusion regarding identity is deemed properly admissible.
Expert witnesses are unique witnesses because they are permitted
to testify about both fact and opinion. Opinion evidence is such a powerful
tool that courts must make sure that it is not abused by either party. The
Federal Rules of Evidence limit almost all other witnesses to factual
testimony and preclude their personal opinions.46 The reasoning behind the
limitation of opinion evidence is the concern for reliability - opinions are
inherently unreliable because they are subjective and not necessarily based
upon any objective facts that can be tested, checked, or appropriately
rebutted through cross-examination.
The purpose behind the evidentiary rules is to ensure that only
reliable evidence is considered by the jury. Thus, in order to protect the
fairness of the trial proceedings and ensure the soundness of the ultimate
verdict, 47 the trial court must uniformly exclude all unreliable evidence.
Examining the proffered expert's opinion under the Daubert-Kumho
standard 48 is part of the qualifying process.
Expert witnesses testify based upon their specialized knowledge
within a given field of expertise. Fingerprint identification is technical and
complicated forensic evidence, and it would be meaningless without the
knowledge and expertise of an expert witness to assist the jury. Latent
fingerprint examiners are vital expert witnesses because they not only
perform scientific analysis on the evidence, but they also explain to the jury
the meaning of the analysis conducted. Nevertheless, the basis of their
opinions must be supported by reliable factual data. It is the reliability of
the factual basis that makes an expert's opinions more reliable than lay
opinions.
In the fingerprint context, for example, the importance of the
expert witness lies not in his or her testimony that a latent fingerprint was
found on the murder weapon, because that print could have been left by
anyone - such as the gun dealer who legitimately sold it, the innocent
citizen who found it and called the police, or even the crime scene
investigator who recovered it. The significant part of an expert's testimony
is his or her opinion as to whether the latent fingerprint found on the
46. See FED. R. EVID. 701 ("Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. If the witness is not testifying
as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of [FRE] Rule 702.").
47. A verdict from a jury that was allowed to consider unreliable evidence would be unavoidably
tainted.
48. See infra Section IV.
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murder weapon matches the accused's known fingerprints. Therefore,
from the viewpoint of testing the reliability of opinion testimony, it is even
more critical to ask how scientifically valid is the factual basis that leads
the fingerprint examiner to conclude that there is a "match"? Without
underlying scientific validity, the ultimate opinion lacks legal reliability
and must be excluded.
Although some argue that excluding any relevant evidence
diminishes the fairness of the process, not all relevant evidence is legally
admissible evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence and supporting
case law. Admissibility of evidence is a two-step process that examines
both the relevance and reliability of the proffer. 49 Notwithstanding this
clear rule, some evidence is routinely deemed admissible without
questioning as to its reliability. In this vein, fingerprints have become
universally accepted as trustworthy and reliable without rigorous
evidentiary analysis. In fact, judges and juries have been relying on
fingerprint evidence for nearly one hundred years. 50
Expert testimony can be used in court in two ways: either as
adjudicative fact 5' or as framework evidence. 52 The more persuasive of the
two is adjudicative fact testimony, in which the expert is permitted to offer
his or her expert opinion of how the science affects the facts - essentially
an adversarial conclusion to the jury on a material fact. An example of
adjudicative fact testimony is the testimony of a fingerprint examiner who
is allowed to testify regarding his expert opinion that the latent prints found
on the murder weapon "conclusively match" the accused's known prints.
In other words, the expert is applying his specialized knowledge to the
specific facts at issue in one particular case and making a conclusion about
those specific facts.
49. See FED. R. EVID. 104.
50. Plaza 11,188 F. Supp. 2d at 554. See also Epstein, supra note 17, at 615-17. The first cases
wherein fingerprint evidence was used occurred in 1911, 1914, and 1915. Epstein notes that these
courts did not articulate a clear basis or standard for the admission of fingerprint evidence. See People
v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (111.1911); State v. Cerciello, 90 A. 1112 (N.J. 1914); People v. Roach, 109
N.E. 618 (N.Y. 1915).
51. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

93 (2002). "Adjudicative facts, in other words, are facts that apply only to the particular parties before
the court. They are used to determine (or 'adjudicate') what happened in a specific case, and not for
some larger purpose, such as to argue that a law should be changed. What Davis called an adjudicative
fact has been referred to by other commentators, e.g., T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS
(1978), as a 'case fact,' and by one court as 'a plain, garden-variety fact.' Bowling v. Dept. of Ins., 394
So.2d 165, 174 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1981)" (citing Davis, An Approach To Problems Of Evidence In The
Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 362, 402 (1942) ("When an agency [or court] finds facts
concerning immediate parties - what the parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background
conditions were - the agency [or court] is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts may
conveniently be called adjudicative facts.").
52. Monahan & Walker, supra note 51, at 361-63.
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After hearing the expert's conclusion, the jury is asked to decide
the guilt or innocence of the accused. In a criminal jury trial in which the
prosecution presents positive fingerprint identification evidence, wherein
the fingerprint expert opines that the latents match the accused, the jury
would have to wholly reject the expert's conclusive opinion in order to find
the defendant not guilty of the charges. Since it is unlikely that jurors will
reject fingerprint evidence, adjudicative fact is, consequently, the most
persuasive use of expert testimony and the type prosecutors try to employ
whenever possible.
In contrast, framework testimony, while helpful to explain the
evidence, is not particularly adversarial or persuasive. It is much less
persuasive for the expert to simply explain what fingerprints are, how a
latent fingerprint is formed, and how a crime scene analyst collects latent
prints. Although it is helpful to the jurors and gives them a framework
from which to understand the crime scene and all the supporting evidence,
it is not nearly as powerful as testimony that articulates a conclusive
identification. In order to give an opinion in the form of an adjudicative
fact, however, there must be a showing that the science behind the opinion
is valid and meets the Daubert-Kumho standard. 53 Therefore, the true
debate remains whether forensic science is science, such that the
methodology used by latent fingerprint examiners is scientifically valid and
legally reliable enough to admit a latent fingerprint expert's conclusive
findings of identity into evidence at trial.
C.

The First Notable Defense Challenge to Fingerprint Identification
Evidence

In January 2002, Judge Pollak, a federal district court judge in
Philadelphia, ruled that an expert fingerprint analyst's opinion was
inadmissible because fingerprint identification evidence did not meet the
Daubert-Kumho standard for reliability.54 Judge Pollak, former Dean of
Yale Law School, is an extremely well respected jurist and his ground53. Plaza I and Plaza I are examples of the difference between adjudicative fact and framework
expert testimony. Although, in Plaza I, Judge Pollak ruled in favor of the defense's challenge to
exclude the expert's opinion testimony, Judge Pollak never ruled that the fingerprint examiner could
not testify at all, even though that is what some news headlines reported. The limitation in Plaza I was
that the expert could only testify to framework evidence and not give an opinion regarding whether the
print was a conclusive match. In order for an opinion regarding conclusive identification to be proper,
the basis for the opinion must have scientific validity as defined by the Daubert-Kumho. However, in
Plaza IA Judge Pollak allowed the expert fingerprint examiner to testify to adjudicative facts - i.e., the
examiner's specific opinion regarding whether defendant Plaza's rolled prints matched the latent prints
found at the crime scene was deemed admissible.
54. See generally Plaza1, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492.
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breaking opinion was not only a victory for the defense bar but was also
newsworthy throughout the legal community. In March 2002, on a motion
to reconsider, Judge Pollak however overruled himself and allowed both
the physical fingerprint evidence collected at the crime scene as well as the
latent print examiner's opinion regarding the identity of the maker of those
prints to be admitted into evidence at trial.
The value of Judge Pollak's ruling in Plaza I is in his application
of the Daubert-Kumho test. Judge Pollak thoroughly applied the Daubert
factors as they were intended by the United States Supreme Court. 56 Most
significantly, Judge Pollak's analysis of the scientific validity of
fingerprints turned conventional thinking on its head, as he systematically
pointed out the weakness of the scientific backbone supporting a
fingerprint examiner's conclusions regarding identity.
Even more
surprising is the fact that judges had never seriously questioned the
admissibility
of fingerprint evidence prior to Judge Pollak's notable
57
opinions.
In his analysis, Judge Pollak approached the evidentiary challenge
of fingerprints with the idea that no evidence is sacrosanct and that all
evidence must be tested by the same procedural rules.58 Accordingly,
Judge Pollak applied the requisite Daubert-Kumho standard to fingerprint
evidence with the same vigor that was applied to cancer and engineering
experts in the landmark cases that created the standard.59 PlazaI and Plaza
II address the main sticking points regarding fingerprint identification
evidence, which are: (1) the unquestioned reliability that has been
artificially placed upon fingerprint evidence and (2) the question of
whether, in fact, forensic science is science at all.
The Daubert-Kumho standard has altered the query that judges
55. Plaza 11, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 at 576.
56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137 (1999).

57. Post-Daubert-Kumho,the criminal defense bar has sought to challenge fingerprint evidence
in approximately thirty-six cases. However, Plaza I is the first case in which the defense challenge was
even partially successful. Previous federal courts, like the one in United States v. Havvard, 117 F.
Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), held that fingerprint evidence met the Daubert-Kumhorequirements and
described fingerprint evidence as "the very archetype of reliable expert testimony .... Id. at 855. See
generally Richard Friedman et al., Expert Testimony on Fingerprints: An Internet Exchange, 43
JURIMETRICS J. 91 (2002); Paul Giannelli, FingerprintsChallenged!, 17-SPG CRIM. JUST. 33 (2002).
58. Plaza!, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
59. In both Daubert and Kumho Tire, the expert witnesses were excluded by the court. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) reh "g en banc denied, (May

3, 1995)(Kozinski, J.) (ultimately rejecting the plaintiffs expert opinion that Bendictin causes cancer
based on the lack of scientific validity of the research done on mice and the fact that the research was
done for litigation); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (affirming that the
trial court properly excluded tire failure analyst's expert testimony that a particular tire failed due to
manufacturing or design defect).
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must make for all experts, with no exception for fingerprint identification
experts. Judges must now inquire as to the forensic methodology used to
test the evidence and the rate of error associated with the specific testing
Under the Daubert-Kumho standard even the venerable
methods.
traditional evidence, like fingerprints, can be legitimately questioned and
can conceivably fail for lack of validity.
It must be reiterated that under Judge Pollak's ultimate holding in
Plaza H FBI-analyzed fingerprints were admitted and deemed reliable.6 °
Thus, currently there is no binding precedent for the proposition that
fingerprint evidence must be excluded or rejected as unreliable.
Fingerprint evidence, however, no longer rests on the bedrock on which it
once resided. The weakness in the "science" has been exposed 61 and the
criminal defense bar will continue to challenge fingerprints and other
traditional forms of forensic evidence.62 Some evidence scholars predict
that it is only a matter of time before fingerprint evidence will be excluded
for lack of scientific validity.63 As of the writing of this Article, no court
has yet felt compelled to exclude fingerprint identification evidence from
being used in criminal jury trials.64

60. On rehearing, Judge Pollak ruled there was sufficient reliability only with respect to the FBIanalyzed prints. Plaza 11, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 575. Moreover, on appeal the related case involving
Defendant Mitchell found the admission of fingerprint evidence and the corresponding expert testimony
properly admitted. See generally United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
61. Not only did Judge Pollak's opinions receive national news attention, an expos6 was aired on
the television program 60 Minutes regarding the issues that fingerprint evidence presents and
specifically the lack of empirical testing that has been done to verify the accuracy of the methodology
and the examiners.
62. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Fingering What's Wrong With Prints, CHICAGO DAILY LAW
BULLETIN, September 16, 2002.
63. See id. "One [fingerprint identification] expert, David Stoney, has declared: 'There is no
justification for fingerprint identification based on conventional science: no theoretical model, statistics,
or an empirical validation process.' [Professor David Faigman] was quoted stating that: 'Within the
next year... some judge somewhere in the country will write an opinion excluding fingerprinting ....
It's inevitable. The research is just too thin to let it in."' In order to rescue fingerprints from the doomed
fate of inadmissibility, it is important that further studies be conducted to accurately assess the error
rates, and that the forensic community adjust its ideology to detect and acknowledge when mistakes are
truly made.
64. Instead, several federal circuit appeals courts have affirmed the admissibility of fingerprint
identification evidence and latent fingerprint expert's testimony. See United States v. Mitchell, 365
F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004), United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003), United States v.
Hemandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2002), United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 2002), United
States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402 (9th Cir.
1996).
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The Shocking Reality of Fingerprint Error: A Murder Case from
Scotland Exposes How Wrong Fingerprint Identification Evidence
Can Be

Scottish Detective Shirley McKie learned from her personal
experience that fingerprints can lie; or more accurately stated, fingerprint
examiners can make mistakes and their expert opinions can be wrong.
Detective McKie's case is an example of fingerprint examiner error
occurring in the most serious of all crimes, a murder case. The case
involved the murder of an elderly woman in her own home, and the
allegation was that she was stabbed to death with a pair of sewing scissors
by her handyman, David Asbury.
As part of the criminal investigation, crime scene analysts
collected all the routine evidence: latent fingerprints, blood, hair, and
fibers. Unexpectedly, however, one of the latent prints found in the
victim's house, specifically on the bathroom door next to the victim's
body, matched homicide Detective McKie's left thumb. Since it is routine
to find police officers' fingerprints at crimes scenes because of their
investigation duties, finding a homicide detective's print, was, in itself, not
significant in this case. Nor was the problem that Detective McKie was
mistakenly implicated in a murder plot due to where her print was found;
nobody ever accused Detective McKie of being involved with the murder.
The problem was that Detective McKie had never been to the crime scene
or inside the victim's house at all, and she was adamant that it was not her
thumbprint. 6 ' Her continued insistence on this point upset her colleagues
as well as the prosecutors who ultimately charged her with perjury, alleging
that she lied at trial when she testified for the defense stating that she had
never been
inside the victim's house where her left thumbprint was
, 66
"found.
65. FrontlineScotland: Fingerof Suspicion (BBC television broadcast, Jan. 22, 2000) (transcript
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l1/hi/scotland/605129.stm)[hereinafler FrontlineJanuary2000] ("The pressure
on [Detective McKie] to change her story intensified. She was visited at home by a colleague bearing
gifts. [The colleague] was there [at Detective McKie's house] [for] three hours... not tell[ing] me to
lie, but say[ing]: 'Look, Shirley, this is serious, and if you're not happy working where you are where
would you like to work?, and we will just say you were basically off your head.' The visit from the
colleague only made Detective McKie more determined because [her department] was not only calling
her a liar but also crazy.").
66. Id.(Detective McKie was not only charged with the crime, but she was also arrested like any
common criminal. This is how Detective McKie described it:
"... I opened the door and there was a
detective chief superintendent and two female detectives standing outside. I was being arrested for
perjury, and I was just in an absolute daze. I went to the toilet. The superintendent told one of the
female officers to go with me. So she followed me into the toilet [and] watched me .... They gave me
an intimate body search... there was no point in that, they watched me get dressed, what did they think
that I had put in there since I'd been watched getting dressed, it was just so unnecessary. But, of
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Fingerprint identification evidence was seminal in the
prosecution's case against handyman David Asbury. In addition to the
"controversial" thumbprint of Detective McKie, the case also involved two
additional inculpatory fingerprints: one print was the accused's, David
Asbury's, found on an unopened Christmas gift inside the victim's house;
and one print was the victim's, found on a biscuit (or cookie) tin containing
£800 recovered in Asbury's bedroom. 67 Based on the money found in the
tin, the prosecution developed a theory that robbery was the motive for the
murder. Together, these two prints linked Asbury to the murder, and he
was convicted.6 8
The jury relied on the accuracy of the incriminating prints to
support the conviction; however, the same Scottish Criminal Records
Office (SCRO) latent print examiners that had analyzed and positively
identified the key prints of Asbury and the murder victim had also
misidentified Detective McKie's left thumb. Yet, it was a misidentification
that the SCRO was unwilling to admit. 69 Furthermore, it was a discrepancy
in the evidence that the jury was willing to ignore; or at a minimum, it did
not stand in the way of the jury's unanimous verdict of guilt. This result
underscores the power of fingerprint evidence upon jurors and the
reinforcement of the myth that fingerprint identification evidence is
infallible. Consistent with conventional wisdom at the time, these jurors

course... they'd been told to do it.").
67. FrontlineScotland: False Impression (BBC television broadcast, May, 16, 2000) (transcript
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/scotland/749442.stm)[hereinafter Frontline May 2000]
(Notwithstanding the prosecution's fingerprint evidence and robbery theory, David Asbury had an
explanation. His mother Amelia Crisp told Frontline: "[The incriminating biscuit tin] was David's tin
and he'd had it three years. It was in his bedroom for three years. We knew he couldn't possibly have
taken the tin out of somebody else's house, so there could not possibly be anybody else's print on it.
The money was [David's too]. David worked.., and he saved money over that period of four
years.... He'd drawn the money out the bank, he was thinking about buying a car." Further, Asbury
did not dispute that the fingerprint on the Christmas gift was not his, but instead explained that he must
have had it "when he stopped at [the victim's house] to use the phone when his car broke down a few
days before the murder.").
68. FrontlineJanuary2000, supra note 65. (Notwithstanding Detective McKie's testimony that
discredited the accuracy of the forensic evidence, "[i]n the end the controversy over the rogue
David Asbury was sentenced to
fingerprint made no difference to the outcome of the murder trial....
life imprisonment.").
69. FrontlineMay 2000, supra note 67. (Even after Detective McKie was acquitted of the perjury
charges based on the testimony of two American fingerprint experts, "the SCRO still refused to admit
there was anything wrong with their identification. The bureau's head, Harry Bell, even wrote in a
memo after McKie's trial that he was satisfied with the integrity of the fingerprint experts from the
SCRO." SCRO maintained the accuracy of its positive identification of McKie's print, even though all
the Scottish police officers who were at the murder scene were interviewed and none were able to
confirm seeing Detective McKie in the victim's house. Frontline conducted its own independent study
and "asked five leading experts to review the evidence [and] their response[s] were unequivocal - the
SCRO had got[ten] it wrong.").
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believed that fingerprints "don't lie," irrespective of Detective McKie's
testimony. 0
Additionally, as far as the Scottish prosecutors were concerned,
Detective McKie had lied about not going to the victim's house, and in so
doing, questioned the reliability of the strongest piece of criminal evidence
there is - fingerprint identification evidence. This was a deed, in their
opinion, that could not go unpunished. Therefore, after the trial and
conviction of David Asbury, Detective McKie was criminally charged with
perjury. In order for Detective McKie to clear her name and defend against
the perjury charge, she had to investigate and build her defense case. On
her own, McKie searched for forensic experts who would examine her
case. On the Internet she learned of Pat Wertheim and Allan Bayle. Pat
Wertheim is an American fingerprint expert with twenty years experience.
Allan Bayle is the United Kingdom's top fingerprint expert, and at the time
was a senior forensic official at New Scotland Yard with twenty-five years
of experience.7 '
When Pat Wertheim examined the latent fingerprint evidence, it
was clear to him that it did not match Detective McKie. However, he was
quite stunned by the evidence as well as the prior analysis by the SCRO.
He explained his surprise to BBC's FrontlineScotland:
[My conclusion was] shocking really. Because here is a
mark, [a latent fingerprint], that was not only identified but had
been verified by three other experts in the SCRO, and allegedly
verified by one other expert outside the SCRO. And to look at
this and think that all these people were wrong left me extremely
disoriented.72

70. See discussion infra Section V (presenting whether jurors should be instructed to consider the
possibility, however slight, that an error in fingerprint identification can occur).
71. Allan Bayle was also one of the expert fingerprint analysts who helped convict the principal
Libyan suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, over Lockerbie, Scotland. See Specter,
supra note 1 at 96; Allan Bayle was also a key defense witness called to testify before Judge Pollak in
Plaza I. See United States v. Llera Plaza (PlazaI1), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2002),
vacating United States v. Llera Plaza (Plaza1), 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002).
72. Frontline January 2000, supra note 65 (Pat Wertheim went on to say in the Frontline
interview that "any competent expert looking at these two fingerprints would have no trouble
whatsoever in reaching the conclusion that the prints could not have been made by the same finger, but
had to have been made by different people."). Another American expert David Grieve analyzed the
prints and also concluded that the latent print found at the murder scene did not match Detective
McKie's. Both Wertheim and Grieve testified at McKie's perjury trial. David Grieve has also written
about the competence of fingerprint examiners. See generally David Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J.
FORENSIC IDENT. 521, 524 (1996) (discussing the fact that in the first proficiency test of 156 fingerprint
examiners, the results revealed that one in five experts would have misidentified, i.e., "provided
damning evidence against the wrong person," and that only 44% of examiners correctly identified all
the fingerprints in the test); see also Collaborative Testing Services, Inc., Forensic Testing Program:
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Allan Bayle's review of the prints came to the same conclusion - the latent
print did not match McKie's left thumb, and in Bayle's opinion, "it wasn't
even a close call."7 3 Bayle determined that the latent print recovered inside
the victim's house was a right forefinger-print, not a left thumbprint.
However, the problem remained that, in Bayle's opinion, neither the SCRO
nor the prosecution could admit to the misidentification of Detective
McKie's print without calling into question the key incriminating prints
that supported Asbury's murder conviction.74 Based on his findings, Bayle
concluded: "I have looked at the McKie case. The mark is not identical. I
have shown this mark to many experts in the UK and they have come to the
same conclusions. 75 For his comments about the McKie case, Bayle has
been "shunned by colleagues," "threatened with disciplinary action" by his
certification board, and ultimately "driven from his job" at New Scotland
Yard after twenty-five years of service.76
Detective McKie was ultimately acquitted 77 of perjury in Scotland,
after Pat Wertheim testified in her defense. The inherent problem with the
fingerprint analysis on Asbury's murder case was not cured by finding
Detective McKie's innocent of perjury.7 8 Instead, this result only
Latent Prints Examination, Report No. 9808 (1998)(unpublished report).
73. Specter, supranote 1, at 96.
74. Id.
75. Id.
see
consultant,
independent
an
as
works
now
Bayle
76. Id.
http://www.expertwitness.com/form/profile.phtml?uname=BAYLE.
77. FrontlineJanuary 2000, supra note 65. ("The High Court jury took less than one hour to
reach its unanimous verdict. Shirley McKie was not guilty of perury. The case made legal history.
Never in over 100 years of fingerprint evidence had an identification been overturned in court."
(Emphasis added)). After the acquittal, Detective McKie's father, lain McKie, "wrote to the Crown
Office to ask if there would now be a review of all the work of the four experts in Shirley's case. The
reply said there would not." Id.
78. Full examination of the fingerprint evidence in the McKie case revealed that the SCRO was
wrong about Detective McKie's fingerprint found at the murder scene, and was also wrong about the
main inculpatory print that linked David Asbury to the murder. After Detective McKie's
misidentification was revealed, eventually the incriminating fingerprints that supported the murder
conviction were re-examined. It was discovered that the fingerprint found on the biscuit tin in Asbury's
bedroom did not match the victim. The evidence presented against David Asbury at trial was erroneous.
David Asbury had always maintained his innocence and his family supported him. See Frontline
January2000, supra note 65; FrontlineMay 2000, supra note 67. On May 2, 2002, a letter was sent to
the Scottish Minister of Justice, Mr. Jim Wallace, from Mr. Michael Russell, a representative of the
latent fingerprint community, supported by 130 fingerprint experts from across the world, stating: "It
can be easily demonstrated and proven that the SCRO experts were clearly wrong in identifying the
mark as Shirley McKie's and this makes the SCRO defense that it is a matter of opinion false and
untenable.... [Furthermore, these] experts have also viewed the disputed SCRO 'identification' in the
David Asbury case and believe it to be equally wrong." For the full letter, see Letter to Mr. Jim Wallace
from Mr. Michael Russell, McKie Page, Complete Latent Print Examination, available at
http://www.clpex.com/Articles/McKie/Russelletter.htm; for additional information about the fingerprint
community's response to the McKie case, see McKie Page, Complete Latent Print Examination,
available at http://www.clpex.com/Articles/McKie/Russelletter.htm.

AM. J. CRIM. L.

[Vol. 31:1

strengthened the argument that fingerprint identification error had occurred
in the case and had also possibly helped convict the wrong man of murder.
The story of the misidentification of Detective McKie has an
atypical result when compared with the typical scenario of an accused.79
Certainly, Detective McKie was wrongly placed at the scene of the murder,
but because she was a respected police detective, nobody even suspected
her of being the killer. Luckily for her, she only lost her job, her career,
and her good name.8 0 The average citizen whose fingerprint links them to a
murder scene would likely lose liberty, and possibly life, if indicted on
capital murder charges. 8 ' Remember, David Asbury's murder conviction
was based at least in part upon allegedly erroneous fingerprint
identification evidence. Even though the reliability of the SCRO's
fingerprint analysis was called into question during the trial, the
incriminating prints were never excluded from evidence, and the SCRO's
expert was permitted 8to
opine that the latent prints matched both the
2
accused and the victim.

No one can say, with any certainty, whether fingerprint
identification evidence is always truly accurate. The point of including this
Scottish case is to exemplify the evidentiary crisis that exists with
fingerprint evidence.8 3 It begs the question of whether the accuracy of

79. See supra note 10. (Richard Jackson & Stephan Cowens are recent examples of "average joe"
citizens being wrongfully convicted based on erroneous fingerprint evidence. Mr. Jackson spent two
years and Mr. Cowens spent six years in prison prior to their ultimate exonerations.)
80. Frontline January2000, supra note 65. (Detective McKie told Frontline: "Still people think
that I was lucky, and that hurts so much, because I wasn't lucky. I told the truth. I got found not guilty,
and someone else made a mistake, and they've got to take responsibility for that. But they're not, and
that is what is frustrating me more than anything. And that's probably why people still think I was
lucky, because nothing has changed.").
81. Frontline May 2000, supra note 67. ("[M]ost of the evidence against David Asbury was
circumstantial. So the print on the tin was to prove crucial. Asbury could offer no explanation as to how
[the victim's] fingerprint came to be on a tin he claim belonged to him. And because the tin contained
so much money it also suggested that the motive for the murder was robbery.").
82. Note, however, that at the request of David Asbury's attorney, both Wertheim and Bayle
reviewed the incriminating prints: 1) the latent print on the Christmas gift tag compared to Asbury's
known prints, and 2) the latent print on the biscuit tin compared to the victim's known prints.
Regarding the gift tag, both agreed the latent print matched Asbury. However, the latent print on the
biscuit tin did not match the victim. This discovery contradicted the SCRO's finding but corroborated
Asbury's consistent urging that the tin and the money was his and had never left his bedroom. Id. Due
to the appellate judge's concern with the reliability of the fingerprint evidence, Mr. Asbury was
released from custody pending appeal. Specter, supra note 1, at 96; FrontlineMay 2000, supra note 67.
In August 2002, after having spent a total of three and a half years in prison, Mr. Asbury's murder
conviction was overturned and his sentenced quashed by The Crown Court. Mr. Asbury commented: "I
want the Scottish Criminal Records Office to admit it made a mistake."
BBC News, Murder
Conviction Quashed, August 15, 2002, availableat http://www.innocent.org.uk/cases/davidasbury/.
83. Id. (John Scott of the Scottish Human Rights Centre stated that "it was alarming in relation to
[Detective Shirley McKie's] position and her fingerprint ....
It's difficult to see how this can be
anything other than the most serious problem that has ever been encountered with fingerprint
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fingerprint identification evidence is a factual truth or merely an urban
legend - a legend that has only been demystified by one misidentified
Scottish detective.84 Although one may compartmentalize this problem as
merely an evidentiary dilemma for the criminal litigator, it is more
accurately described as an issue threatening the public confidence of the
jury system and the reliability of modem criminal law. Indeed, it poses a
serious menace to justice.8 5
IV.

Applying the Daubert-Kumho Standard to Fingerprint Experts

A.

The Daubert-Kumho Standard Unwrapped

The following discussion of the standard applied to expert opinion
testimony is aimed at illuminating three salient points: 1) the Daubert
court's articulated standard for how expert opinion testimony will be
judged, 2) the Daubert court's detailed reiteration of the judge's role as
gatekeeper of relevant and reliable evidence, and 3) the Kumho Tire court's
extension of the Daubert factors to all expert witnesses including nonscientists, such as latent fingerprint examiners.
Prior to 1993, there was a debate regarding the prevailing authority
governing the admission of expert testimony: whether the Frye test 86 or
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was the primary authority. The distinction
between the two standards was that the Frye test only allowed for the
testimony of experts whose opinions were "generally accepted in the
scientific discipline, 87 whereas Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allowed for

evidence.").
84. Id. (quoting Detective McKie: "And they, [the Scottish Criminal Records Office] were
prepared to do that to me, so I mean, who else? Who else is in jail just now because of fingerprint
evidence.").
85. Detective McKie's situation is extremely unique because she was never charged with the
underlying murder, notwithstanding that her prints were found in the room where the murder took place
and there was no benign explanation for the print being there. No explanation was given other than
McKie's assertion that it was a misidentification; however, law enforcement never acknowledged a
forensic mistake. It is truly a bizarre scenario. What did law enforcement think McKie's motivation to
lie was, if she was not involved in the murder, and everyone can agree that she was not? Why would
she go to such great lengths to say she was misidentified if she truly was not? If law enforcement will
not believe the word of its own detective, or ever admit human error, no accused should believe the
axiom "innocent until proven guilty;" instead it is more accurate to believe "guilty notwithstanding
proof." I wonder how David Asbury would describe it. In a BBC News report Mr. Asbury was
described as bitter about his experience and stated: "I cannot describe it in words. It is beyond
description." See BBC News, supra note 82. Cf State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W. 2d 574, 580 (Minn. 1982)
(on appeal, defendant's conviction was reversed due to erroneous identification made by both
prosecution and defense experts).
86. Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923).
87. Id. at 1047; See also Monahan and Walker, supra note 52, at 27.
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the admission of expert testimony that "assisted the trier of fact., 88 The
Frye test was adopted in 1923; however, the dispute arose in 1975 once the
Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted.
The dispute, specifically, was whether Federal Rule of Evidence
702 was meant to supplement or replace the older Frye test. Scholars
opined about the two rules and many journal articles were published on the
subject; however, the question remained unsettled until the United States
89
Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.
The Daubert decision made clear that Federal Rule of Evidence 702
replaces Frye. Daubert thus articulated a new standard to apply to expert
testimony, which resulted in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 being amended
in 2000 to properly reflect the Daubert holding. 90 Consistent with the
focus of Daubert,the amended Federal Rule of Evidence 702 addresses the
concern for validity of the science behind the expert's opinion. 91
The Daubert court dealt exclusively with scientific experts and left
open the question of how other expert witnesses should be qualified. The
92
Supreme Court answered that question in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
which extended the Daubert test to all expert witnesses, not just scientists.
The Daubert-Kumho standard presents a new approach to examining expert
opinion testimony, and an authentic application of this approach is still

88. FED. R. EvID. 702.
89. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
90. The old FED. R. EvID. 702 Testimony by Experts stated: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." This version was in force when the cases of
Daubert, General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999) were decided. The new FED. R. EVID. 702 Testimony for Experts (as amended in 2000)
states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case." ("[Committee Note:] Rule 702 has been amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert,including Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). In Daubert the Court charged trial judges with the
responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony, and the Court in Kumho
clarified that this gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just testimony based on
science. [citation omitted] The amendment affirms the trial court's role as gatekeeper and provides
some general standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered
expert testimony. Consistently with Kumho, the Rule as amended provides that all types of expert
testimony present questions of admissibility for the trial court in deciding whether the evidence is
reliable and helpful.")
91. There is scholarly debate regarding whether the current version of FRE Rule 702 does
accurately reflects the Daubert-Kumhostandard.
92. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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evolving as challenges are raised against traditional forms of criminal
evidence, such as fingerprint identification evidence.93
In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court articulated an
approach for trial judges to follow when determining whether expert
opinion testimony should be admitted. The approach can be described as a
three-step rule. Step one is essentially a relevance inquiry. The court must
determine whether the expert witness is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge (2) that will assist the trier of fact to understand and determine a
fact in issue. 94 This requires a preliminary assessment of whether the
opinion testimony is scientifically valid and is legally relevant to the facts
in issue.
Step two determines scientific validity, i.e., legal reliability. The
primary factors weighed are: (1) scientific methodology, (2) peer review,
(3) rate of error and (4) general acceptance. The scientific methodology
factor asks whether the science can be or has been tested, or whether the
hypothesis has been falsified. 95 The peer review or publication factor
involves an inquiry into whether the work has been submitted to the
scrutiny of the scientific community. Peer review scrutiny is a component
of testing "good science" in part because it increases the likelihood that
substantive flaws in the methodology have been detected. Publication is a
relevant factor, but it is not dispositive because in some cases wellgrounded but innovative theories will not have been published. Also,
theories that have less commercial value may lack publication
opportunities. The rate of error factor asks what the potential rate of error
is and inquires about the existence and maintenance of standards
93. With regard to fingerprint identification evidence and the expert latent print examiners that
proffer this evidence, courts are not consistent in their application of the Daubert-Kumho test, and there
is no uniform approach to weighing the relevant factors. The bench is consistent and unanimous in its
rulings, thus far, that fingerprint identification evidence meets the standard and is admissible as both
relevant and reliable in criminal jury trials; see supranote 64.
94. See FED. R. EVID. 104.
95. W. PAUL VOGT, DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS AND METHODOLOGY 91 (1993)
(Falsificationism is "the doctrine, originating with Karl Popper, that we can only refute ('falsify')
theories; we can never confirm them. A good theory is one that we have tried repeatedly, but
unsuccessfully, to disprove or falsify."). Null Hypothesis is "the hypothesis that two or more variables
are not related or that two or more statistics (e.g. means for two different groups) are not the same. In
accumulating evidence that the null hypothesis is false, the researcher indirectly demonstrates that the
variables are related or that the statistics are different. The null hypothesis is the core idea in hypothesis
testing." id. at 156. See also Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 505 (discussing the distinction between
adversarial testing and scientific testing). See generally Michael Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin
Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643 (1992); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits JurassicPark:
The Far-ReachingImplication of the Daubert Court's Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific
Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 62 (1995); Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of
Daubert:A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 755-56 (1994).
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controlling the technique's operation. 96 The general acceptance factor is a
throwback to Frye and explores how well accepted the work is by the
scientific community.
Under Daubert, as distinct from Frye, the relevant scientific
community is not strictly defined to a particular degree of acceptance
within that community. Daubert, unlike Frye, does not require literal
"general acceptance;" instead, "minority acceptance" is sufficient to satisfy
this prong of the test. Additionally, it is important to be mindful that the
Daubert test is a fluid and flexible test and that no one factor is decisive.
The four factors specifically listed are not the only factors the court can
consider in assessing scientific validity, and the factors are not necessarily
weighed equally or applied in every case.
For example, although
fingerprint evidence has strong acceptance and may satisfy the general
acceptance prong, that fact alone is not enough to satisfy the Daubert test
for scientific validity. As Judge Pollak wrote in Plaza I:
General acceptance by the fingerprint examiner
community does not, however, meet the standard set by Rule
702. First, there is the difficulty that fingerprint examiners,
while respected professionals, do not constitute a "scientific
community" in the Daubert sense. Second, the Court cautioned
in Kumho Tire that general acceptance does not "help show that
an expert's testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks
reliability." The failure of fingerprint identifications fully to
satisfy the first three Daubert factors militates against heavy
reliance on the general acceptance factor.
Thus, while
fingerprint examinations conducted under the general ACE-V
rubric are generally accepted as reliable by fingerprint
examiners, this by itself cannot sustain the government's burden
in making the case for the admissibility of fingerprint testimony
under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 97

Step three focuses solely on the principles and methodology, not on the

conclusions that they generate. This is a very important step in the analysis
96. When analyzing the scientific validity of fingerprint evidence, the rate of error is typically an
issue of great contention. It is problematic because the error rate is currently due to lack of empirical
study. However, the rate of error issue poses more complex problems because one may tend to conflate
multiple error rates instead of evaluating each distinct error rate and its specific threats to both internal
and external validity. For example, the methodology employed by the fingerprint examiner may yield
an error rate of zero. (In fact, this is actually what FBI experts purport the error rate to be.) However,
the error rate of the latent print examiner may be 50%. But it would not be accurate to simply say that
fingerprint evidence could be wrong 50% of the time. This point will be made more clearly in Section
IV.C.2, wherein error rates are discussed in more detail and the Mitchell experiment is explained.
97. Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 151).
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and the fictional blindness it requires is critical. The expert witness'
proffer must be analyzed without concern for the expert's actual
conclusions. Therefore, when analyzing whether a fingerprint examiner
can testify regarding his or her opinion of the identity of the latent print
found on the murder weapon, the judge cannot consider whether the
identification will be positive, negative, or inconclusive. The conclusion is
immaterial because Daubert is a quest for relevant and reliable evidence,
not a search for specific conclusions.
Analysis of the reliability disjointed from the conclusion also
eliminates, at least in theory, the possibility for unfairness to either party in
the litigation. If the science behind fingerprint identification is sound, then
both the prosecution and defense can present their respective witnesses and
ask their opinions regarding the true identity of relevant latent fingerprint
evidence. If the evidence is unreliable, its use will be disallowed for both
parties equally.
The Daubert factors are not intended to be an exhaustive list of
things for the court to consider, and no one factor should be seen as
tantamount to the others.98 For further guidance, although not binding
authority, it is illustrative to examine the additional factors the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 99 on remand, considered in
its application of the Daubert test. The Ninth Circuit focused significant
attention on whether the scientific research was research independent of
the litigation. 00
98. Federal courts interpreting the application of the Daubert standard and its flexibility have
expanded the list of factors the court should consider to determine reliability of the expert's opinion.
The Third Circuit in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 742 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994),
expanded the list of relevant factors for consideration: "(1)whether a method consists of a testable
hypothesis; (2) whether the method has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; (5) whether
the method is generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the technique to methods which have been
established to be reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on the
methodology; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has been put."
99. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). After the United
State Supreme Court articulated the Daubert test, it remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for that
court to reevaluate whether plaintiff's expert was qualified to testify in light of the new Daubert test
factors.
100. Cf Plaza 1,179 F. Supp. 2d at 507, n.17. In response to the recent post Daubert challenges
to fingerprint evidence, the National Institute of Justice began soliciting fingerprint research to be
conducted. The advertisement was placed under "Areas of Research Required" and read: "statistical
validation of individuality in friction ridge analysis," "qualitative/quantitative aspects of friction ridge
comparison," and "statistical validation of standard operating procedures for friction ridge (fingerprint)
comparison." (citation omitted) The solicitation further stated that the need for this research/testing
stemmed from Daubert: "All expert testimony must follow the admissibility rules for scientific
evidence set forth in recent court cases e.g. Daubert.... These rules require scientists to address the
reliability and validity of the methods used in their analysis. Therefore, the purpose of this solicitation
is to address the needs identified in the above NIJ publication and to provide greater scientific

AM. J. CRIM. L.

[Vol. 31 1

The Ninth Circuit opined that research independent of litigation
was objective proof that it comports with good science. An expert is less
likely to be biased toward a particular conclusion if the research is
independent. Independent research carries its own indicia of reliability
because it normally satisfies a variety of standards to attract funding and
institutional support. 01 The market factors of supply and demand will
limit the number of experts conducting independent research in a particular
area, thus providing a natural constraint on the parties' ability to "expert
shop" for desired conclusions.
In its application of the "independence" factor to the underlying
of
the case, the appeals court further explained the type of evidence
facts
that would help to overcome a taint of research done for litigation
purposes. "The party proffering the expert must show other objective and
verifiable evidence to prove the testimony is based on 'scientifically valid
principles.' This can be done by showing peer review or publication and
scrutiny of the scientific community.,' 0 2 Although the same Daubert
factors apply to evidence produced solely for litigation, the Ninth Circuit
application of the rule teaches the trial judge to apportion the most weight
to the scientific methodology and peer review factors and the least weight
On balance, scientific findings
to the general acceptance factor.
will
more easily survive Daubert
of
pending
litigation
independent
03
scrutiny.1

Fingerprint identification evidence is weakened by this point.
Forensic work is almost exclusively conducted for litigation purposes. 0 4
Additionally, it is most often done "in-house" by a corresponding law
enforcement agency connected to the prosecution. 0 5 Thus, it is appropriate
foundation for forensic friction ridge (fingerprint) identification."
101. Daubert,43 F.3d at 1317.
102. Id. at 1317-18.
103. Another factor the Ninth Circuit considered was whether the research was described in
sufficient detail in order for the court to determine if the research was scientifically valid. See Id. at
1318.
104. See generally Harvard Law Review Association, Evidence - FingerprintExperts -- Seventh
Circuit Upholds The Reliability Of Expert Testimony Regarding The Source Of A Latent FingerprintUnited States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001), 115 HARV. L. REV. 2349, 2351 (2002). This
article points out that the Havvard court "failed to expose weaknesses in the fingerprint examiner
community.... Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive application of the Daubert factors
because the fingerprint examiner community, unlike most other expert communities, has developed
exclusively for litigation and does not have a tradition of disinterested self-testing." Id. Cf Daubertv.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 n.5 (The court took exception to latent fingerprint
experts. Although their analyses are conducted for the purpose of litigation, the court stated that
fingerprint experts should not be penalized as heavily as other experts whose research would not
normally be a subject of litigation: "As to such disciplines, the fact that the expert has developed an
expertise principally for purposes of litigation will obviously not be a substantial consideration.").
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 is the discovery statute that treats law enforcement and prosecutor's
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to place heightened emphasis upon the methodology, testability, peer
and measurable error rates of fingerprint identification
review scrutiny,
06
experts. 1
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner,'0 7 the United States Supreme
Court stated that "abuse of discretion" is the appropriate appellate standard
of review by which to evaluate a trial court's decision to admit or exclude
expert testimony after conducting a Daubert inquiry. In Joiner, the trial
judge excluded the expert's testimony and held that the gap between the
scientific data and the expert's opinion was too great. In other words, there
was insufficient reliability that the opinion was supported by valid
science. ° 8 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the
trial judge should have admitted the expert testimony because it was legally
reliable and the jury could have determined the correctness of the
competing expert opinion.' 0 9 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals, holding that the appropriate standard of review is
abuse of discretion and0 that the trial judge, as the gatekeeper, had not
abused that discretion.'"
The abuse of discretion standard articulated in Joineris significant
because it provides little redress against unfavorable trial court rulings.
The Ninth Circuit Daubert court, on remand, stated that "trial judges may
not simply defer to the scientific community, but must make their own
determination whether the proffered evidence meets minimum standards of
scientific validity.""' Further, because the Daubert test is so fluid and
depends widely upon the discretion of the individual judge, the potential
for inconsistency in admissibility of the same evidence in different
courtrooms is a realistic concern for litigants. For standard types of expert
testimony, like fingerprint identification, it is problematic that one lone
judge can determine for his courtroom that fingerprint identification
evidence lacks scientific validity notwithstanding its universal acceptance
office as one entity for the purpose of discovery and possession of evidence. Therefore, the argument
that the FBI is a separate agency from the U.S. Attorney's Office is transparent and ineffective in this
context.
106. In this regard, the defense's argument for exclusion gains the most steam and provides
context for Epstein's assertion that fingerprint analysis is merely an "unfounded creation of the law
enforcement examiner." Epstein, supra note 17, at 607. In essence, the defense is seeking exclusion
based on bias and lack of integrity, not only of the "scientific" analysis of the evidence, but also based
on the inherent prejudice or bias of the expert who conducted the analysis for a self-serving purpose.
107. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
108. See id. It is the responsibility of the moving party to proffer sufficient scientific evidence to
the trial judge to support the opinion the expert wants to make before the jury.
109. See id.
110. See id.
S11.Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1316. See also ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK 2D,
§8:6 (2001).
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in every other courtroom in the jurisdiction. Therefore, the cost of
Daubert's flexibility is a lack of certainty of outcome. In the context of
criminal cases, the right to present certain relevant evidence should not be a
function of which court one haphazardly lands.
The Daubert-Kumho standard is more lenient and theoretically
should allow more expert testimony into evidence. Although when
applying the test to certain evidence that has strong general scientific
acceptance but weak external or independent empirical testing, such
evidence may still be excluded because general acceptance is only one
factor of the test. That is exactly the hurdle that fingerprint evidence is
seeking to overcome.
In other words, notwithstanding its general
acceptance in the forensic community and in the legal community, it still
must be established that the methodology is sound and any error rate is
known and measurable.
Therefore, although the Daubert-Kumho standard was intended to
be a more flexible standard by which more science, including innovative
and new science, could be admitted, it also works as a stricter rule when
applied to old science, like fingerprint analysis, that has never been
scientifically validated but instead has been universally accepted by the
courts as reliable. Thus, notwithstanding nearly 100 years of unquestioned
admissibility, the Daubert-Kumho standard creates a new evidentiary
quandary for fingerprint evidence whose use pre-dates the American jury
system. 112 As was made clear by Judge Pollak's opinion in Plaza I,
however, adversarial testing is not the type of testing to which the Daubert
court was referring and is an
insufficient substitute for rigorous empirical
13
study and scientific testing."
Trial practice and evidence scholar Roger Park, therefore, asserts
that, "Daubert both raises the bar and lowers it.,

114

Daubert properly

places the focus on the scientific validity of evidence and diminishes the
importance of general acceptance. This shift in focus is extremely
significant. Consider Professor David L. Faigman's 1 5 analogy of the
acceptance of fingerprints in the law to the use of leeches in medicine:
Leeches were used for centuries.... It was especially

common for the treatment of pneumonia and it was considered
112. See generally Cole, supra note 19, at 96.
113. Plaza!, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
114. Park, supra note 11l,at 8-22.
115. Professor David Faigman, professor of law at the University of California, Hastings College
of the Law is an expert legal scholar in evidence and has published many articles on the subject. He is
the primary author of the treatise MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY (West Publishing Co. 2002).
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an effective therapy. It wasn't till late in the nineteenth century
that they did the clinical tests to show that leeches did not help
for pneumonia, and they may have actually hurt. Fingerprinting
is like that in at least one critical way: it is something we assume
works but something we have never properly tested. Until we
test our beliefs, we can't say for sure if we have leeches or we
have aspirin .... One of the things that science teaches us is that

you can't know the answers until you ask the questions. 16
In this light, the danger of admitting evidence that lacks proven
scientific validity is exposed. Professor Faigman's comparison correctly
labels the weakness of the forensic science of fingerprint analysis by
illustrating why it is not science at all - it has been unwilling to ask the
necessary questions and test the hypothesis." 7 Michael Specter's article in
The New Yorker, on the reliability of fingerprint evidence, synthesizes the
point that "[s]cientific methodology is based on generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they make sense; in laboratories throughout the
world, researchers spend at least as much time trying to disprove a theory
as they do trying to prove it. Eventually those ideas that don't prove false
are accepted.' 8
Fingerprint analysis was developed not as a science; thus, its
conclusions have not been scientifically analyzed for validity. Instead,
fingerprint identification was developed as a law enforcement tool to keep
track of criminal identities,'' 9 and as such has never been subjected to
rigorous testing. Christophe Champod, a British fingerprint examiner,
criticized his colleagues at an industry conference in Wales in 2001.
"[Champod] told the audience that they had only themselves to blame for
the state of the field [of fingerprint identification], that for years they had
resisted any attempts to carry out large trials [or studies]....
Regardless of the reason for not conducting the supporting research
for fingerprint identification, the lack of empirical study and testing of the
processes 12is a glaring lacuna in the overall methodology of forensic
"science. , 1 On balance, it is the unknown answer to the question of
whether a fingerprint examiner's conclusions are scientifically valid which

116. Specter, supra note 1, at 101 (quoting Professor Faigman).
117. Not until the Mitchell ruling was the industry concerned with testing its scientific validity.
Real scientific research is not contingent upon court rulings, real science is driven by the need to check
its
own accuracy and falsify its hypothesis. Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
118. Specter, supra note 1, at 101.
119. See generally, Cole, supra note 20.
120. Specter, supra note 19, at 102.
121. The FBI does require more education and training for its examiners. See Plaza 11,188 F.
Supp.2d at 555-56 n.2.
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causes discord with the Daubert-Kumho standard. For example, a known
rate of error could be considered by the court and found scientifically
reliable. But an unmeasured and unknown rate of error weighs against an
expert's opinion being legally reliable.
Daubert's focus on the validity of the science makes the DaubertKumho standard a drastic shift from Frye, since the Frye test merely
required the relevant scientific community122 to agree that the methodology
or opinion was generally acceptable. The Frye test created a situation in
which the forensic community, specifically latent fingerprint examiners,
universal and
could agree not to test their own methods and still enjoy
123
findings.
conclusive
their
of
admissibility
unquestioned
B.

Plaza I & H: Federal District Court's Application of the DaubertKumho Standard

Many courts avoid doing a thorough Daubert analysis for all
expert witnesses, not just latent fingerprint experts. Fingerprint evidence,
however, presents an even more blatant example of judicial unwillingness
because of the generally held belief that fingerprints are reliable. 24 Thus,
the first reaction of judges to evidentiary challenges to fingerprint
identification evidence is instinctively to conclude: "there is nothing here
to analyze, motion denied." Many judges rule orally without even having a
Dauberthearing on the merits of the challenge.
Judge Pollak became the exception to the rule and seriously
considered the evidentiary motions to exclude fingerprint evidence in
United States v. Llera Plaza.125 Judge Pollak issued two written opinions
on the issue, Plaza 1126 and Plaza 1I.127 In Plaza I, relying on the transcript
122. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
123. See, e.g., Moon v. State, 198 P. 288, 290 (Ariz. 1921) (A 1921 state supreme court
acknowledged that the admission of the expert opinion of latent fingerprint examiners was well settled
in the United States).
124. See generally United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the
district court did not err in admitting fingerprint testimony); United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d
848, 855 (stating that "latent print identification is the very archetype of reliable expert testimony"),
aff'd 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (reviewing the district court's determination de novo and finding that
the district court did not err in its consideration of the Daubert factors as they apply to fingerprint
techniques); United States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp. 2d 79, 82 (D.C. 2000) (declining to hold a pre-trial
Daubert hearing and finding that fingerprint identification techniques are "well-established
principles"); United States v. Reaux, 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. July 31, 2001) (relying on the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Havvard and admitting fingerprint testimony); United States v. Martinez-Cintron,
136 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.P.R. 2001) (admitting fingerprint examination testimony); United States v.
Joseph, 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001) (finding that fingerprint analysis is "scientific
knowledge").
125. Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002).
126. Id.
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of the Mitchell1 28 hearing, Judge Pollak held that fingerprint examiners
could not give their expert opinions regarding the identity of the
fingerprints, but they could testify about fingerprints in a more general
manner. 129 Judge Pollak ruled that the testimony of the proffered latent
fingerprint expert witnesses would be allowed to:
1) describe how the rolled and latent fingerprints at
issue in this case were obtained, 2) identify and place before the
jury, the fingerprints and such magnifications as may be required
to show minute details, and 3) point out observed similarities
and differences between any latent print and any rolled print the
government contends are attributable to the same person. The
defendants may present expert fingerprint testimony countering
the government's fingerprint testimony. But no expert witness
for any party would be permitted to testify that, in the opinion of
latent print is - or is not - the print of a
the witness, a particular
30
particular person.'
Judge Pollak's ruling was clearly the first "successful" defense challenge to
fingerprint identification evidence.' 3 ' Although the defense motion sought
to exclude the fingerprint evidence entirely as unreliable, preventing the
prosecution's expert from rendering a conclusive opinion regarding
identity was still considered a significant defense victory. Under the Plaza
I ruling, the prosecution's expert witness would not be able to opine that
the incriminating latent prints matched the accused. No one had heard of
such a thing. This type of evidence had been routinely admitted in criminal
trials since 1918.132 How could Judge Pollak have ruled this way?
127. 188 F. Supp. 2d 549.
128. United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, United States v.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
129. In other words, the judge's ruling intended to exclude adjudicative fact testimony but allow
framework testimony by the expert.
130. Plaza1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 518.
131. PlazaIs ruling is still problematic because it allows the jury, armed with no methodology
or experience whatsoever, to ultimately determine whether the prints match. This result seems illogical,
since the evidentiary problem is that the ultimate opinion is a "'subjective decision' is... based upon
the examiner's knowledge and experience and... ability which may in some instances be insufficient
or produce erroneous analysis." If that is the case, the jury's opinion is no different and an even less
reliable opinion upon which to determine guilt or innocence. At least the examiner's subjective
determination of identity is based upon some level of experience and training, whereas petit jurors
typically serve on only one criminal case in their entire lifetime and have no prior experience
comparing fingerprints. See generally Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citing Test. Ashbaugh, Tr. July
7, 1999, at 115-16, testimony regarding the fact that the final determination of identity is "a subjective
decision ... based on [the examiner's] knowledge and experience and... ability.").
132. In 1918, there was no articulated standard for fingerprint experts in U.S. courts. American
courts relied on opinions from sister jurisdictions which had already admitted fingerprints. However,
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Upon close examination of the evidentiary requirements for expert
opinion testimony articulated in the Daubert-Kumho standard, Judge
Pollak's ruling was not radical. Pollak appears to be the first judge to fully
analyze the scientific validity of fingerprints under the true tenets of the
Daubert-Kumho standard. In effect, Judge Pollak was only limiting the
prosecution's ability to use the most persuasive form of expert testimony adjudicative fact in the form of a conclusive opinion regarding the identity
of the fingerprints. Yet he was still allowing the expert to testify regarding
framework evidence, the meaning and significance of fingerprints
themselves. 133 It was only the expert's ultimate conclusion regarding
identity that lacked scientific validity under the Plaza I opinion.
What makes the ruling particularly newsworthy is the fact that the
expert's opinion involved fingerprint identification - a type of evidence
that has universal and unquestioned acceptance. But the part that is equally
troubling is that the mainstream news stories only picked up on the ruling's
limitation of the expert's opinion regarding identification and did not
comment on the opinion's detailed analysis regarding fingerprint
evidence's lack of: 1) testing, 2) peer review and/or publication, and 3)
measured rate of error and controlling standards. The news wire blurbs did
not articulate that the "final decision [of fingerprint identification] is a
Nor was it
subjective decision,"' 134 with no objective standards.135
broadcasted that there are no uniform qualifications to be hired as a
and examiners are not required to be certified or
fingerprint examiner, 136
tested for competency.
The holes in the procedures that are exposed in the Plaza I opinion
are startling. It is even more puzzling why it has taken nearly a century for
the methodology of forensic science to be closely examined, or, rather, the
lack of close examination to be questioned. Although no longer legally
binding as good law, Plaza I's analysis is still interesting and has relevancy

none of the sister jurisdictions were applying Frye, Daubert, or any other type of test to fingerprint
evidence. Therefore, the origin of fingerprints' general acceptance is one of unquestioned wholesale
acceptance. Amazingly, it is from this seemingly weak historical authority that the overwhelming belief
in the infallibility of forensic evidence comes. FAIGMAN, supranote 2, at §27-1.2.7 [pocket part].
133. Limiting testimony to framework evidence has been done with other experts; however, the
ironic part is that the other experts were told that their science was not as reliable as fingerprint
evidence. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 895 (D.C. 1983) (In the context of a hearing
to determine the scientific validity and legal reliability of the expert opinion testimony of battered
woman's syndrome expert, which at that time was a novel theory, the court stated: "This is why the
judiciary should proceed with reasonable caution, where the evidence comes as a new scientific theory,
as distinguished from a well established field, e.g., fingerprint evidence.").
134. Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
135. Id. at 513-14.
136. Id.
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in the larger debate of the
scientific validity and admissibility of fingerprint
137
identification evidence.
C.

Arguments the Criminal Defense Bar Has Asserted Against the
Admission of Fingerprint Identification Evidence

1.

One Hundred Years of Adversarial Testing Does Not Establish
Scientific Validity

Daubert's focus is on determining whether the underlying
principles of an expert's opinion are valid and whether these principles
were established by using proper scientific methods. In other words,
Daubert is not satisfied by a simple showing of "general acceptance," or
even universal acceptance, of fingerprints by courts over the last one
hundred years. General acceptance is only one factor of the Daubert
analysis. 138 In order to fully weigh the value that the last one hundred
years should have on the question of current admissibility of fingerprint
identification evidence, one must consider the operative
evidentiary
139
introduced.
first
were
fingerprints
when
1911
in
standards
In 1923, when the Frye general acceptance standard was adopted,
fingerprints, although still untested, had already gained general acceptance
in the law enforcement and forensic "science" communities and thus
satisfied the Frye standard. 40 After examining the evidentiary standard, or
137. Defenders contend that Judge Pollak got it right the first time and his more rigorous and
stricter application of the Daubert-Kumho standard in Plaza I is the more correct application of the
standard for legal reliability under the current evidentiary rules. However, no other federal district court
has agreed with the Plaza I analysis, notwithstanding the several subsequent motions that have been
filed in various federal districts; see United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004)(The
Mitchell and Plaza cases share some of the same Dauberthearing record. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals recently affirmed both the conviction and the admission of the fingerprint evidence by the trial
court.); see generally listing of evidentiary challenges to fingerprint evidence in federal district courts,
at http://onin.com/fp/daubert-links2.html. See also discussion infra Section IV.D; but cf discussion
infra Section IV.E (considering the consequence that blanket exclusion of fingerprint evidence would
eliminate its use to exonerate the wrongly accused.).
138. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-1.2.7 [pocket part], at 38-39. ("More importantly, under
Daubert, general acceptance must be evaluated in conjunction with other factors. In fields which have
been found to have a vigorous tradition of testing, that which becomes generally accepted carries more
weight than in fields without such a tradition. Where inquiry into other factors (testing, methodological
quality of published peer reviewed research, error rates) does not support admission, general acceptance
does not become the one last hook on which admission decisions can be hung. As the Supreme Court
put it in Kumho Tire: "general acceptance does not 'help show that an expert's testimony is reliable
where the discipline itself lacks reliability."' Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
151(1999).).
139. See Epstein, supra note 17, at 615-17.
140. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-1.0, at 348 ("The seminal cases admitting fingerprint evidence
in American courts paid so little attention to the foundation of the asserted science that they offer no
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lack thereof, that has been applied to fingerprint identification evidence
over the last hundred years, the adversarial testing argument loses some of
its strength. Additionally, there is no showing that fingerprint evidence has
ever been scientifically tested or rigorously analyzed for its validity in a
court of law, until most recently. Thus, the general acceptance of
fingerprints over the last century, in actuality, is judicial general
acceptance, not scientific general acceptance. Therefore, reliance upon the
last one hundred years to support the current admission of fingerprint
evidence misstates the evidentiary standard of both Frye and Daubert.
Both require general acceptance by the scientific community, not the legal
community, 14 ' and the general acceptance prong implies the existence of
some type of scientific examination of the proffer.
When considering what prior courts have done in the past, it is
important to remember that fingerprint evidence is not akin to a legal
construct like opening statement, cross-examination, or selection of the
jury - procedures created within the legal system to ensure fair trial and
due process. The efficacies of adversarial tools are what years of
adversarial process can test. The adversarial system cannot test science. It
is simply not designed for such a task and is ill equipped to accomplish it.
The evidentiary standard regarding the admission of expert
testimony has changed in order to better ensure that only reliable and
relevant evidence is admitted. Therefore, proof that prior courts over the
last century accepted fingerprint evidence is somewhat irrelevant to the
current evidentiary standard of Daubert-Kumho. Further, the hundredyear-argument is flawed in the same way the reasoning that "my
grandfather, and his father, and his father before him did it this way" is a
flawed rationale to establish whether my grandfather's way is the proper
way to do things. Akin to Professor Faigman's leeches example, just
because admitting fingerprint evidence without question is what has been
done for a long time does not mean it is correct.
Daubert does not look to legal precedent regarding what other
courts have done; it looks for scientific validation of the principles
underlying the expert's opinion. The Daubert-Kumho standard requires
judges to examine the relevance and reliability of the expert with full
consideration of the "task-at-hand" in light of the specific facts before the

help in evaluating the admissibility of fingerprint identification evidence under Daubert and Kumho
Tire.").
141. Id.For an example of the court misstating the significance of the one hundred years of
accepting fingerprint evidence, see United States v. Cline, 188 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1294 (2002) ( "Used
successfully in criminal trials for over 100 years, fingerprint identification analysis has withstood the
scrutiny and testing of the adversarial process.").
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Therefore, without scientific testing of the theories and
methodology that support examiners' conclusions regarding fingerprint
identity, their opinions cannot be deemed reliable under current evidentiary
rules.
court.

2.

14 2

The Unknown Error Rate of Fingerprint Identification Analysis
Makes It Unreliable Evidence

The defense argument urges that the unknown error rate of
fingerprint examiners makes fingerprint identification evidence unreliable.
Judge Pollak addresses the issue of error rates, distinguishing the different
rates of error for analysis of known prints and analysis of latent prints. The
dissimilarity is quite startling.
The Plaza I decision was made based on the record of the Daubert
hearing in the related Mitchell143 case. In Mitchell, the government
proffered an experiment to prove the accuracy and scientific validity of
fingerprint analysis. There were two parts to the experiment. In the first
part, the FBI sent out defendant Mitchell's ten-print card, i.e., a complete
set of Mitchell's known fingerprints, to be compared with the databases of
known fingerprint records in other states. The result was that only one
match was reported - in Philadelphia where Mitchell was arrested and incustody. Philadelphia was the only state in which Mitchell had known
prints on file; therefore, this part of the experiment was successful. It was
intended to show that fingerprints are unique and that multiple matches
would not occur from one set of prints - the premise being no two
fingerprints are alike.
The accuracy of comparing full sets of known prints to one another
is not the real issue regarding the admission of fingerprint identification
evidence. The contention is regarding the comparison of known prints to
latent prints. The significant difference is that latent prints that are taken
from crime scenes are smaller and imperfect prints. Also, the condition of
these latent prints varies from clean, to smudged, to bloody, to even one
being on top of the other; thus, the accuracy of latent print identification is
where the real evidentiary challenge lies. 144
The second part of the Mitchell experiment addressed the concerns
of latent prints, which proved to be more problematic. In the second part,
the FBI sent Mitchell's ten-print card along with the latent prints that were
142. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597; Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141.
143. United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002), af'd, United States v.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
144. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at §27-1.2.11 [pocket part].
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in question to thirty-four different state labs, i.e., thirty-four different
jurisdictions with thirty-four different forensic fingerprint examiners. The
FBI requested analysis and comparison of the prints for identification. The
results were not good. Twenty-five agencies reported a conclusive match.
Nine of the thirty-four were however unable to identify the prints as a
positive match. This result was troubling because fingerprint examiners
purportedly adhere to the forensic principle of being extremely
conservative and only declaring a conclusive match when the evidence is
very clear; thus, if there is any question, the examiner is to err on the side
45
of caution and opine no match. 1
If, however, fingerprint analysis is as accurate as proponents claim,
and if the conservative principle is employed, all thirty-four examiners
should have unanimously reported no match.
Notwithstanding this
ideological inconsistency, the remainder of the experiment makes matters
worse. The FBI, in an effort to "correct" the errors in the first analysis, sent
letters to the nine examiners who failed to identify the prints, explaining
the significance of the Mitchell experiment and its use in a pending
Daubert hearing. Along with these letters, the FBI included enlarged
photos of the fingerprints in question and pointed out similarities in the
prints for the examiners to see more clearly. 146 After receiving this
additional guidance, almost like magic, all nine examiners were able to
identify the prints as a positive match.
The FBI did not see a problem with the methodology of this
experiment.147 When the FBI fingerprint expert, Mr. Meagher, was asked
to explain why the nine examiners initially failed to identify the rolled
fingerprints and the latent fingerprints as a match, the following
explanations were given:
[T]he examiner did not know that the survey was
145. Id. at §27-1.2.
146. Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 513, n.23 ("Mr. Meagher followed up by sending photographic
enlargements of the prints in a plastic sleeve, on which the level two Galion detail information was
marked. Mr. Meagher asked the nine agencies to reconsider their initial responses, emphasizing that the
survey was being prepared for a Daubert hearing. All nine agencies changed their responses and made
a positive identification.").
147. Id. (quoting from Mr. Meagher's testimony cited by the court: "Well, just as if I would have
done in-house with any examiner, especially in a training status, if an individual fails to make an
identification that we believe they should have been able to, we would take that information back to the
individual, show them the characteristics of which they should take into consideration, ask them to
reassess their position and, you know, use the information that's now presented to them and try to come
up with the same conclusion. That is, that the two prints were identical.") However, the Mitchell
experiment was not an FBI training exercise; it was a test to prove the accuracy of fingerprint analysis
and the lack of error. It was needed to bolster Meagher's testimony that the error rate of fingerprint
analysis methodology is zero. Id. at 511.
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related to a Daubert hearing (citation omitted); the photos of the
ten-print card [i.e., suspect's known prints] or latent prints were
insufficiently clear (citation omitted); three of the examiners
"just screwed up" (citation omitted); inexperience (citation
omitted); insufficient time (citation omitted); the examiners[']
"attitude toward the survey was not as serious as it should have
been" (citation omitted); and "it was late in the
148 day and the
examiner was probably tired. (citation omitted)"

Are these reasons supposed to make one feel more secure about the work
of latent fingerprint examiners? These excuses appear to solidify the
defense bar's contention that the accuracy of fingerprint identification is
suspect. Further, it seems to prove that the examiners' high accuracy rate
has been assumed but never proven.
The impromptu Mitchell experiment clearly identifies the
weakness of "practitioner error."' 149 Judge Pollak's assessment of the
Mitchell experiment was mixed. Regarding the portion of the experiment
that compared Mitchell's known prints with the state records of other
known prints, wherein a "hit" was only reported in Pennsylvania, Pollak
found this "was significant confirmation of the uniqueness of

fingerprints.' 150 Regarding, however, the "survey" of thirty-four state
agencies comparing Mitchell's known prints to the crime scene latent
prints, Pollak found "the survey results fall far short of establishing a
'scientific' rate of error; they are (modestly) suggestive of a discernible
' 51
level of practitioner error.'
148. Id. at 512-13. (quoting from the testimony of the FBI's fingerprint expert Meagher in the
Dauberthearing for the Mitchell case that was relied upon in PlazaI).
149. Id.In Plaza I the government took the Daubert factor, rate of error, and divided it into two
parts: methodology error and practitioner's error. One government expert, Dr. Budowle, testified that
the methodology error cannot be measured: "We have to understand that error rate is a difficult thing to
calculate. I mean, people are trying to do this, it shouldn't be done, it can't be done." Id. at 510.
Although never scientifically measured, Mr. Meagher ultimately testified that the error rate as applied
to the scientific methodology is zero. Id. at 511. The Mitchell experiment was conducted to show a low
practitioner's error rate, but failed in this regard. Cf United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 239-40 (the
appeals court concluded that although the Mitchell experiment yielded several false negatives, the
experiment exhibited a low false positive error rate).
150. Id.at 512.
151. Id. at 513. The court also included a footnote on the issue of error: "The defendants also
point out that in proficiency examinations that were given to fingerprint examiners beginning in 1995,
the error rates have been alarmingly high. In 1995, fewer than half of the 156 participating examiners44% - correctly identified all five latent prints that were being tested, while 31% of the examiners made
erroneous identifications. See Possession of Truth, 46 J.FORENSIC IDENT. 521, 524 (1996)(Def. Ex. 2).
While the results had improved somewhat by 1998, only 58% of the examiners correctly identified all
the matching prints and did not make incorrect identifications. Latent Prints Examination Report No.
9808, Forensic Testing Program 2 (Def. Ex. 3). As with the Mitchell survey, these proficiency
examination results may be taken as somewhat suggestive of practitioner error. However, it should be
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The Mitchell experiment is significant in three important ways, as
it highlights: 1) the lack of accuracy among fingerprint examiners,
specifically with regard to latent prints which are almost always the most
incriminating type of fingerprint evidence used in a criminal case, i.e., the
latent print found on the murder weapon; 2) the lack of scientific
methodology employed within the "forensic science community,"
evidenced by how Mr. Meagher administered the "survey" portion of the
Mitchell experiment, the excuses he gave for the inaccurate results, and his
attempt to "correct" the mistakes by telling the examiners what their
findings should have been; and 3) the lack of any scientific study to
establish the scientific validity of fingerprint identification was confirmed
by the FBI's mid-trial, haphazard "Mitchell experiment" done in order to
prove that fingerprint evidence is reliable. This experiment, albeit
unintentionally, emphasized the fact that no real studies exist
which
52
scientifically analyze the accuracy of fingerprint identification.
The real lack of study notably sets forensic "science" apart from
other forms of science. The legal treatise Modern Scientific Evidence notes
that "[m]ost fields of normal science could pull from the shelf dozens or
hundreds, if not thousands, of studies testing their various hypotheses and
contentions, which had been conducted over the past decades or century,
and hand them to the court."' 53 The distinction of forensic science from
other types of science is further illustrated by a response Mr. Meagher gave
in an interview to journalist Michael Specter from The New Yorker
magazine wherein he was asked whether forensic science was science:
Meagher said that he didn't think of science as a term
that could be easily defined or tailored to fit all disciplines in the
same way. "There is academic science, legal science, and
forensic science .... They are different. You can be an expert in

the field and give testimony without having an academic level of
stressed that these results, standing alone, can hardly be regarded as significant evidence of what the
'rate of error,' in the Daubert sense, may be. 509 U.S. at 594." Id. at n.24.
152. FAIGMAN, supra note 2,§27-1.2, at 360 ("An interesting postscript to the Mitchell case is
the discovery after trial and conviction that the FBI had prevailed upon the National Institute of Justice
to delay release of its request for research proposals to test important beliefs about fingerprint
identification until after the conclusion of Mitchell's trial. Thus, at the same time the FBI was telling
the Mitchell court that everything that needed to be known to confirm the reliability of fingerprint
identification already was known, they were telling the NIJ to delay the process of funding research
aimed at answering some of the unknowns, studies that itwas hoped would be useful in defending
against future challenges." (citation omitted)). Cf.United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 257 (The
appeals court rejected Mitchell's Brady violation claim and also stated "we conclude that a reasonable
jury would not conclude that the solicitation [by the NIJ for further research regarding fingerprints] was
the smoking gun that Mitchell makes it to be.").
153. Id. at 358.
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scientific knowledge.... It is not achievable to take pure science
and move it into a legal arena." This seemed surprising, since
Meagher had often argued that, when performed correctly,
fingerprint analysis is an "objective" science. In 1999, when he
was asked in court whether, based on unique properties of
fingerprints, he had an opinion of the error rate associated with
his work, he said: "As applied to the scientific methodology, it's
zero." (Scientists don't talk this way; it is an axiom among
in biology is true a hundred
biomedical researchers
1 54 that nothing
percent of the time.)

Specter asked Professor Faigman's opinion of Meagher's
definition of science being different types: "academic science, legal
science, and forensic science."' 155 Reportedly, Professor Faigman's
response was first laughter then a comment that Meagher's logic "of
course... makes no sense." 15 6 Professor Faigman drew a different
analogy of how "forensic science" relates to real science:
Mr. Meagher operates on a sixteenth-century notion - a
Francis Bacon idea - of what science is all about. To me, the
analogue for law is meteorology. It deals with physics and
chemistry - the most basic sciences. Yet it has to make
predictions and empirical statements regarding complex reality.
That is because so many factors determine the weather that it's
really a57 probabilistic science. And I think fingerprinting is the
same. 1

154. Specter, supra note 1, at 104.
155. Id. Cf United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 219 (The appeals court found that Defendant
Mitchell's experts were properly precluded from testifying "about whether latent fingerprint
identification is a "science.")
To the extent that Mitchell's attack rests on his experts' claim that latent
fingerprint examiners do not engage in "science," he does not heed the text of
Rule 702 or the Supreme Court's teachings in Kumho Tire. Rule 702 "makes no
relevant distinction between 'scientific knowledge' and 'technical' or 'other
specialized' knowledge." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167. The
very holding of Kumho Tire is that those categories simply address what type of
testimony is covered by the rule, and that, in addressing admissibility under Rule
702, the same factors generally apply to all categories of expert testimony.
Kumho Tire explicitly rejected as unworkable and unnecessary any "distinction
between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized'
knowledge." Id. at 148, 119 S.Ct. 1167. That a particular discipline is or is not
'scientific" tells the court little about whether conclusions from that discipline
are admissible under Rule 702; at best, there will be some overlap between the
factors that bear on a field's status as "science" and Daubert's factors addressed
to reliability. Reliability remains the polestar. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 104-05.
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At first blush, Professor's Faigman's comparison of fingerprint
identification to weather prediction seems a bit extreme. Faigman's
comments are however useful to illustrate the point that neither law nor
forensic science deals in absolute certainties. It is a myth that latent
fingerprint identification is absolutely accurate or has an error rate of zero,
particularly since fingerprint identification is based on a statisticalprobability model.' 58 It is important to note that an analysis conducted
based upon a statistical-probability model can still be reliable. Two critical
questions must, however, be tested: 1) what is the probability of an
erroneous match, and 2) under what circumstances are errors more likely or
less likely to occur. 159 These questions have not been asked of fingerprint
identification evidence and the lack of knowledge of the real answers to
these questions is what makes the conclusions drawn from fingerprint
analysis suspect and arguably unreliable.
Although a jury's verdict is the final answer to the legal question
of guilt or innocence, it is not absolute proof of whether the defendant
committed the crime. The applicable standard is not proof beyond all
doubt, 60 but rather it is proof beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, there is an
error factor for juries as well. The rigorous scrutiny applied to the
evidence the jury is allowed to consider is crucial in order to keep jury
error as low as possible. Therefore, the "gatekeeper" role is essential.
Defense challenges to the scientific validity of the evidence must be taken
seriously, and the Daubert-Kumho standard applied thoroughly to all
evidence, especially fingerprints.

158. Id. at 105 (Quoting Mr. Meagher: "Our system is a huge statistical-probability model, but it
doesn't make identifications, because it doesn't have all the information that is needed. It's a job for

human beings.").
159. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-1.2.11 [pocket part], at 42-47.
160. One counter-argument suggests that current defense motions to exclude fingerprint
identification evidence seek to push the evidentiary standard or burden of proof to "absolute certainty."
However, certainty can never be absolute in any case or controversy, nor is law or science intended to
be absolutely certain about anything one hundred percent of the time. If the evidentiary standard were
heightened to "absolute certainty," no evidence would ever be admitted. Not even eyewitnesses would
be satisfactory enough witnesses because statistics prove their testimony is often flawed with errors.
Instead of changing the standard to absolute certainty and thereby excluding all evidence that falls
short, justice demands the inclusion of relevant evidence and a heightened ability for opponents to
contradict and challenge the evidence presented. See also infra Section V. (This section discusses the
special jury instruction method to alert jurors of the possibility of fingerprint examiner error.)
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The Lack of Uniform Standards for Fingerprint Analysis Weakens
Its Scientific Validity Under Daubert'sMethodology Factor

The case against the scientific validity of fingerprint identification
is further strengthened after examining the facts regarding the experts'
training, qualifications, and standards for identification. One might be
surprised to learn that there are no mandatory qualifications to become a
fingerprint examiner. 161 Though "[t]he Scientific Working Group on
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study, and Technology (SWGFAST) adopted
'quality assurance guidelines for latent print examination' in 1997, ''l62 the
SWGFAST's guidelines are optional, not mandatory.
Further, there appears to be no uniformity among examiners
regarding the training they have received, the organization through which
they are certified, or the minimum level of education required. 163 The
International Association of Identification (IAI) "is a forensic organization
here in the United States that supports training and holds conferences and
attempts to set standards for the United States."' 64 IAI certification is,
however, not mandatory, and many examiners are not part of IAI.
Although most examiners are certified at least by their own local
jurisdiction's police agency, there are no uniform standards required for
are determined by the
these certifications; instead, the requirements
65
1
widely.
vary
and
jurisdictions
individual
161. United States v. Llera Plaza (Plaza1), 179 F. Supp. 2d at 514. See also David L. Grieve, The
Identification Process: The Quest for Quality, 40 J. FORENSIC IDENT. 109-11 (1990). "Traditionally,
fingerprint training has centered around a type of apprenticeship, tutelage, or on-the-job training, in its
best form, and essentially a type of self study in its worst. Many training programs are the "look and
learn" variety, and aside from some basic classroom instruction in pattern interpretation and
classification methods, are often impromptu sessions dictated more by the schedule and duties of the
trainer than the needs of the student. Such apprenticeships are most often expressed in terms of
duration, not in specific goals and objectives, and often end with a subjective assessment that the
trainee is ready." Id.
162. United States v. Llera Plaza (Plaza 1), 179 F. Supp. 2d at 514; see also United States v.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 241 (The appeals court found that "maintenance of standards" of latent
fingerprint examiners does not favor admitting their opinions, although the overall Dauberttest is
met. "Some standards do remain: There are procedural standards (such as ACE-V) and
terminological standards (such as naming conventions for Galton points.) But these are
insubstantial in comparison to the elaborate and exhausting refined standards found in many
scientific and technical disciplines." Id.).
163. Id.(The FBI's Mr. Meagher testified that "while some FBI examiners are certified by the
International Association for Identification (IAI)," [Mr. Meagher] was certified by the FBI.); see also
FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-2.2.6, at 385 ("Fingerprint examiners differ in their level of training,
experience and ability."); but see Plaza 11,188 F. Supp. 2d at 556, n.2 ("To become an FBI fingerprint
examiner one must have a bachelor's degree - preferably as a science major - and then successfully
complete a two-year in-house training program culminating in a three-day certifying examination.").
164. PlazaI, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 514, n.27.
165. See FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at §27-1.2.7 [pocket part].
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Fingerprint Identification Is Based upon the Subjective Decision of
the Examiner, Not Science

When considering scientific analysis, one automatically assumes
that the tests conducted are based on objective standards. One may have
presumed that fingerprint analysis is conducted by a computer or by some
other sophisticated machine.'1 66 Therefore, it might further be thought that
because these are scientific tests, conducted with objective standards,
maybe even with some foolproof automated computer system, that the
specific qualifications of the individual actually examining the evidence is
of little consequence. These are all common assumptions laypeople have
about fingerprint identification evidence, and these assumptions act to
solidify the heightened reliability associated with fingerprint identification
evidence. These assumptions follow the conventional myth that fingerprint
examinations are objective and scientific, and that is why "fingerprints
don't lie." The reality of the process is quite different.
In actuality, latent fingerprint identification is a subjective decision
of the examiner. 167 Although computers might be used to initially retrieve
the known fingerprint records to compare to the latents, this computer
search merely "provides a list of candidates ... [but the] direct
comparisons are made by a fingerprint examiner."'168 Therefore, the
validity of the analysis is uniquely connected to the specific knowledge,
ability and experience of the individual examiner who conducted the
analysis. 169 This may explain why when experts Pat Wertheim and Allan
Bayle examined Detective McKie's fingerprints in Scotland they easily
determined there was no match; it was not even a close call for them.
Their analyses, however, were based on twenty and twenty-five years of
experience, respectively. Arguably, the SCRO's examiners were just not

166. IAFIS is a FBI computer that does attempt to identify fingerprints. Specter, supra note 1,at
99. IAFIS is a huge database of known prints and can be used to retrieve candidate "suspects" for
comparison. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at § 27-2.0; CBS, supra note 10 ("On TV, fingerprints are
matched automatically by computer. But that never happens in real-life forensic work.").
167. Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 513. (The issue of the subjectivity of the examiner's ultimate
opinion was not even a contested point in the litigation. "[The] Government and defense witnesses
agreed that the actual identification of a latent fingerprint - this is, the decision that the ridges of the
two prints that are being compared are sufficiently 'identical' to be considered an 'absolutely him'
match - is a subjective determination").
168. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-2.1.2[2], at 376.
169. Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 513-14. ("Sergeant Ashbaugh testified for the government: 'The
opinion of individualization or identification is subjective. It is an opinion formed by the friction ridge
identification specialist based on the friction formations found in agreement during comparison. The
validity of the opinion is coupled with an ability to defend that position and both are found in one's
personal knowledge, ability and experience."').
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as knowledgeable or astute. 1 70 These types of inconsistent findings are
especially alarming when dealing with the serious issues of guilt and
innocence coupled with life-altering criminal sanctions - the stakes are too
high for inexperience. Subjectivity in this regard is dangerous.
An unidentified SCRO fingerprint expert commented specifically
on Detective McKie's case and generally on the reliability of fingerprint
identification evidence. He agreed that Detective McKie's print was
misidentified, but was still confident in the reliability of fingerprint
identification evidence. He said: "The system of fingerprint identification
is infallible. The expert individually is not. Any expert can make a
mistake, and should be seen to admit making a mistake."'' The truth is
that the forensic community is not at the point where it is willing to admit
error. The SCRO has not admitted its error. And in the United States, the
Mitchell experiment proves that the FBI's stance is not that different.
Although the Mitchell experiment did not produce any misidentifications
from the various jurisdictions conducting the analysis, Mr. Meagher's
excuses for the horribly inconsistent conclusions show that fingerprint
examiners in the United States are also unwilling to admit mistakes even
after they are blatantly exposed. 72 Mr. Meagher testified in the Mitchell
case that the error rate of latent fingerprint examinations was zero.73
During the Daubert hearing in Plaza I, Judge 74Pollak received the
following testimony from defense witness Dr. Stoney: 1

170. Yet, the SCRO claims their examination was also verified by four other experts, three
internal and one independent, who all agreed that the mark matched Detective McKie. See Frontline
January2000, supra note 65.
171. FrontlineJanuary 2000, supra note 65.
172. However, not all law enforcement agencies and fingerprint examiners are unwilling to admit
their errors. See Mnookin, The Washington Post, supra note 10 (in the investigation of the Madrid
terrorist bombing, FBI agents admitted they had erroneously identified Oregon lawyer Brandon
Mayfield when the print actually belonged to Ouhname Daoud, an Algerian man.); See also LAS VEGAS
REV. J., supra note 10. ("Las Vegas police had mistakenly matched the fingerprints ... with those of a
decomposed woman's body found in June in the desert east of Las Vegas." According to Lt. Tom
Monahan of the Metropolitan Police Department Homicide Section, "[t]here's no question. A mistake
was made.").
173. Plaza/, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 511.
174. Dr. Stoney earned a Bachelor of Science in chemistry and criminalistics, a Masters of
Science in Public Health, and a Ph.D in forensic science from the University of California, Berkeley.
He has published various texts and journal articles on his thesis of quantitative statistical fingerprint
modeling, and worked at the Institute of Forensic Sciences Criminalistic Laboratories in Oakland,
California (an independent crime lab). He has performed various forensic examinations, including
latent print comparisons. He has served as an associate professor and director of the Forensic Science
Program at the University of Illinois, Chicago. Dr. Stoney is the director of the McCrone Research
Institute in Chicago, Illinois. Stoney has published approximately two dozen articles on various aspects
of forensic science, including fingerprints. His main criticism of fingerprint identification evidence is as
follows: "I) ACE-V methodology has elements of subjectivity and the evaluation is ultimately not
scientific; 2) No objective criteria or measurements are used to measure individuality; 3) Reliability of
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The determination that a fingerprint examiner
makes.., when comparing a latent fingerprint with a known
fingerprint, specifically the determination that there is
sufficient basis for an absolute identification is not a scientific
determination. It is a subjective determinationstandard. It is
a SUBJECTIVE determination without objective standards to it.

Now, by "subjective" I mean that it is one that is dependent on
the individual's expertise, training, and the consensus of their
agreement of other individuals in the field. By "not scientific"
I mean that there is not an objective standard that has been
tested; nor is there a subjective process that has been
objectively tested. It is the essential feature of a scientific
process that there be something to test, that when that
something is tested, the test is capable of showing it to be
false. 175

On balance, this exploration into the latent fingerprint examination
process clarifies why a close application of the Daubert-Kumho standard is
so important. Since the final decision regarding identity is based on a
subjective determination by the examiner, scrutiny of the methodology
employed by examiners is imperative in order to determine whether the
evidence is legally reliable.
D.

Motions Challenging Scientific Validity Continue, Yet Federal
Courts Still Find Latent Fingerprint Identification Legally Reliable
Evidence

"It can hardly be disputed, of course, that a consensus exists in the
general public, as well as the judiciary, that latent fingerprint
identifications are perfectly reliable."'1 76 Yet, as the current fingerprint
evidence debate exposes, there is no clear consensus between prosecutors

examiners practicing the ACE-V method has not been sufficiently tested; 4) Error rate is meaningless
without a standardized objective method of measurement; 5) Ultimately, fingerprint identification
works and it is good evidence, but it isn't science and it doesn't meet Daubert requirements." See
http://www.clpex.com/Articles/TheDetail/TheDetail60.htm.
175. United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 226 (2004). Plaza 1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 514
(emphasis added) (Judge Pollak opined: "With such a high degree of subjectivity, it is difficult to see
how fingerprint identification - the matching of a latent print to a known fingerprint - is controlled by
any clearly describable set of standards to which most examiners subscribe."). Id.
176. Epstein, supra note 18, at 646. See also United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 241 (The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals also found that the lack of standards was one factor that weighed against
admissibility.).
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and defenders whether current forensic methodology constitutes "good
grounds" sufficient to support the conclusive findings of latent fingerprint
analysis. That is why previously welcomed fingerprint experts are now
being greeted with motions to exclude their testimony. Notwithstanding
the vigorous challenges waged by skilled defense attorneys in various
federal districts, motions to exclude have all been unsuccessful.
It is well established in the minds of the judiciary and proponents
of fingerprint evidence that, even with scant empirical testing of its
accuracy, latent fingerprint analysis is something more than guesswork.
Further, they believe fingerprinting has sufficient evidentiary reliability to
be used in a court of law. Even in the face of these recent evidentiary
challenges, the judiciary is not willing to denounce fingerprints, a form of
evidence that has supported thousands of convictions, simply on the
speculation of its "newly discovered" unreliability.
Arguably there is prudence behind judicial skepticism of blanket
exclusion. It is true that fingerprint analysis has not undergone the scrutiny
of hypothesis testing, falsification, and peer review, which true science
demands. Under a liberal reading of the Daubert-Kumho standard,
however, trial judges have consistently held that neither the United States
Supreme Court nor the Federal Rules of Evidence mandate exclusion when
a weakness or error in the evidence is discovered.17 7 The federal district
courts have not agreed with defense attorneys' strict reading of the
Daubert-Kumho standard.178 The defense bar's interpretation is arguably
constricted and misstates the judicial requirements as gatekeeper. Further,
no court has found fingerprint identification evidence legally unreliable for
lack of scientific validity. Instead, the courts have repeatedly followed a
more expansive reading of the Daubert-Kumho requirements. 179
177. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. ("Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject
of scientific testimony must be 'known' to a certainty; arguably there are no certainties in science.").
178. Even Judge Pollak's ruling in Plaza I did not find that fingerprint evidence should be
completely excluded as unreliable. Instead, Plaza I held that the latent fingerprint examiners, for both
the prosecution and defense, could testify to framework evidence, but not to ultimate conclusions
regarding positive or negative identification. Plaza1, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
179. Even while Plaza I was still good law, other federal trial courts refused to follow Judge
Pollak's analysis and rejected the conclusion that latent fingerprint experts were not qualified to testify
to conclusive opinions regarding identity. See United States v. Salim, 189 F. Supp. 2d 93, 101
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("This Court is unpersuaded by [Plaza /]'s reasoning, for it hearkens to an
imprudently stringent understanding of scientific objectivity. Contrary to the Plaza [1] reasoning, the
mere fact that an expert utilizes his or her expertise and training to determine whether there is enough
agreement of the various print ridge formations to be able to individualize and ultimately, to 'match' a
print, does not constitute an absence of standards to render the technique unreliable. Rather, the
methods of comparison are in fact testable such that both parties can subject prints to verification. The
appropriate attack of an expert's 'match' opinion is in rigorous cross-examination and the presentation
of other experts to challenge the findings, not the whole-sale preclusion of a reliable methodology.").
Instead, several federal circuit appeals courts have affirmed the admissibility of fingerprint

50

AM. J. CRIM. L.

[Vol. 31:1

This liberal reasoning and application was articulated by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litigation"' (hereinafter Paoli H), which states the postDaubert'81 requirements for legal reliability in the following manner:
[Plaintiffs] do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their
experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate by a
preponderance of evidence that their opinions are reliable....
Daubert states that a judge should find an expert opinion
reliable under Rule 702 if it is based on "good grounds," i.e., if it
is based on the methods and procedures of science. A judge will
often think that an expert has good grounds to hold the opinion
that he or she does even though the judge thinks that the opinion
is incorrect.... The grounds for the expert's opinion merely
have to be good, they do not have to be perfect. The judge
might think that there are good grounds for an expert's
conclusion even if the judge thinks that there are better grounds
for some alternative conclusion, and even if the judge thinks that
a scientist's methodology has some flaws such that if they had
been corrected,
the scientist would have reached a different
82
result.
When Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 702 was amended in 2000, the Rules
Advisory Committee adopted the Paoli 1I reasoning and explained that
expert opinion testimony could be admitted even if the expert was "not
rely[ing] on anything like a scientific method."' I8 3 In other words the
expert's opinion testimony may be admissible,
if "it is properly grounded,
' 4
well-reasoned, and not speculative." 18
Proponents of the reliability of fingerprint identification evidence
would agree that the more expansive reading of the Daubert-Kumho
standard is an accurate interpretation of the evidentiary rules and remains

identification evidence and latent fingerprint expert's testimony. See generally United States v.
Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004), United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003), United
States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2002), United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir.
2001), United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996).
180. 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (commonly referred to as Paoli I). Paoli I is an influential case
in the Third Circuit, which is the same circuit from which Judge Pollak and the Plaza I & 11 cases
come.
181. Paoli 1I was decided post-Daubertbut prior to the amendment of FRE Rule 702, and prior
to Kumho Tire's extension of the Daubert standard to non-scientists.
182. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation (PaoliH) 35 F.3d at 744.
183. FED. R. EVID. 702, Testimony by Experts, advisory committee's note.
184. Id.
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consistent with the spirit and letter of the standard the United States
Supreme Court articulated in Daubert. The Daubert court stated:
Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that
the subject of scientific testimony must be "known" to a
certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.... But, in
order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed
validation - i.e.,
testimony must be supported by appropriate
"good grounds," based on what is known.1 85
In a corresponding footnote, the Daubert court clarified its
understanding of "good grounds" to be synonymous with trustworthinessin other words, evidentiary reliability consistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 186 Opponents protest that the underlying support for the experts'
conclusions is unscientific and unproven - not "good grounds.' 87 The
Daubert court, however, never intended expert opinion testimony to be
flawless, without weakness, or even without error in order to be admissible
in a court of law. 188 One federal judge even opined that "[t]rials would be
very short if only perfect evidence were admissible.' 8 9
185. Daubert,509 U.S. at 590-91.
186. Id. at 590, n.9 ("We note that scientists typically distinguish between 'validity' (does the
principle support what it purports to show?) and 'reliability' (does application of the principle produce
consistent results?) ... [O]ur reference here is to evidentiary reliability - that is, trustworthiness ... [Iun

a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliabilitywill be based upon scientific validity.").
187. See Epstein, supra note 17, at 648-49. Epstein argues that effective cross-examination
and/or the use of a defense fingerprint expert would not cure problems in the methodology of
fingerprint analysis. "But to the extent that there are reliability problems inherent to fingerprint
methodology itself, the retention of a defense expert might not do any good. Just as two polygraph
examiners might reach the wrong conclusion about whether someone is telling the truth, because of the
deficiencies in the polygraph, so too might several fingerprint examiners make a false identification
with respect to a particular fingerprint because of the deficiencies in the standard and procedures of the
fingerprint profession. Indeed, in one of the most famous cases of fingerprint error, the
misidentification was made not only by the prosecution's expert, but by a defense-retained expert as
well. The erroneous identification was discovered only upon the subsequent trial of the defendant's
wife." Id. Cf United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 239 (The appeals court found that there was no
showing that there is a significant problem with latent fingerprint experts, largely because the errors
identified were false negatives and not false positives. The appeals court was less concerned with
errors reflected in false negative results: "While a system of identification with a high false negative
rate may be unsatisfactory as a matter of law enforcement policy, in the courtroom the rate of false
negatives is immaterial to the Daubertadmissibility of latent fingerprint identification offered to prove
positive identification because it is not probative of the reliability of the testimony for the purpose for
which it is offered (i.e., for its ability to effect a positive identification).").
188. See Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, DNA and Innocence Scholarship, in WRONGLY
CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 241, 249 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey

eds., 2001). Well-known defenders of innocence Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld recognize that simple
error does not equal inadmissibility. When speaking of DNA testing, forensic evidence, and
exoneration, they note: "[t]he underlying theory and methods used for forensic DNA testing are surely
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The real legal question that remains open is: how grave must the
potential for error be before the gatekeeper must find the proffered opinion
no longer supported by "good grounds?" Proponents of the reliability of
fingerprint identification evidence urge that the United States Supreme
Court purposely left this question open to the discretion of the gatekeeper.
That is precisely why the Daubert factors are explicitly not a finite set of
considerations; instead the trial judge is required and even encouraged by
the spirit of Daubert-Kumho and the Federal Rules of Evidence to liberally
construe the rules to favor admissibility rather than exclusion. The
Daubert court specifically rejected the Frye standard because it was too
strict and inflexible, and inconsistent with the more
90 liberal admissibility
standard intended by the Federal Rule of Evidence.'
Although some evidence scholars and critics of forensic science
predict that fingerprint identification evidence will soon be excluded for
lack of scientific validity, the courts' rulings are not leaning that way.
Therefore, it is important to consider the due process concems that still
exist, assuming the status quo of the continued admission of fingerprint
evidence.
E.

Should Defense Attorneys Be Careful What They Wish For?
Exclusion of Fingerprint Identification Evidence Would Also
Eliminate Its Use for Exoneration Purposes As Well

Not only is fingerprint identification evidence used by the
prosecution to convict, it also has significant exoneration power and can
greatly bolster a defendant's claim of innocence.' 91 Mindful of the
sound; yet like any scientific technique, it can, and has been, applied incorrectly. Many of the concerns
include errors in sample handling, interpretation of results, and collection and preservation of samples.
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that DNA testing has been the most reliable and revolutionary tool of
forensic scientists since the invention of fingerprinting." Id.
189. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club, 34 F.3d 410, 415-16 (holding
that, even where the expert's mistake was discovered, exclusion was not required.).
190. Daubert,509 U.S. at 589. ("Given the Rules' [FRE] permissive backdrop and their inclusion
of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention 'general acceptance,' the assertion that the
Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made 'general acceptance' the exclusive test
for admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.").
191. Defenders cherish all means that enable them to prove the innocence of their clients with
some measure of scientific certainty. Compare DNA exonerations with the use of fingerprint
identification evidence. At the advent of the use of DNA, scientists and lawyers hotly debated the
scientific validity of DNA and whether it was legally reliable evidence. However, now DNA analysis is
responsible for several exonerations. As of February 2004, one hundred and forty-one post-conviction
DNA exonerations have been reported in the United States. Furthermore, the scientific technology of
DNA testing is improving everyday, wherein its purported results are deemed to be even more certain.
Scholars anticipate record numbers of additional exonerations to surface. Scheck & Neufeld, supra note
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defendant's right to a fair trial and to defend against the charges, negative
fingerprint evidence is often used to further the defendant's theory of the
case, such as "I could not have done this crime because my prints do not
match those found on the murder weapon." Therefore, one must critically
consider whether the defense argument for blanket exclusion of fingerprint
identification evidence actually benefits the accused and enhances due
process.
The defense argument may in fact overstate the deficiencies of
fingerprint identification evidence, and thereby, as an unforeseen but
natural consequence of the argument, advocate for eliminating the use of
fingerprint evidence for exoneration purposes. Although zealous, the
argument for blanket exclusion is short-sighted.
FBI expert Mr. Meagher testified in the Mitchell and Plaza
hearings regarding the actual process of fingerprint analysis. In short,
Meagher described that there are three levels of detail in each fingerprint
that an examiner evaluates prior to making a positive identification. The
latent print must consistently match the known exemplar at each of the
three levels of analysis in order to constitute a conclusive match. However,
an examiner can make an exclusion, i.e., determine that the latent does not
match the accused, based on only one level of analysis. "[T]he standard for
One
single dissimilarity of an
exclusion is one of dissimilarity.
'1 92
unexplainable nature constitutes exclusion."
Thus, although based on the same methodology that is used to
make positive identifications, the standard for exclusion is easier for the
examiner to achieve because a suspect's known prints must be excluded
from consideration if only one level of inconsistency is found. The truth is
that examiners often make negative or inconclusive findings, or both,
which helps the defendant's case. Yet, if fingerprint evidence is excluded
as unreliable, defendants would be unable to utilize negative and
inconclusive findings to challenge the charges against them.
The defense bar's evidentiary challenge against fingerprint
evidence, although currently focused on the prosecution's introduction of
188, at 249; see Cole, supra note 19, at 5; see generally EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH

INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996)(National Institute of Justice). Although it is true that the science of
DNA testing is much more sophisticated than the methodology of latent print comparison, DNA is not
infallible either. Id. ("Not even DNA testing is fool proof. Only a fool would make that claim.")
Ironically, according to the vocal critics of fingerprint identification evidence, the apparent evidentiary
value of DNA testing and fingerprinting has flip-flopped. "At the turn of the twenty-first century, the
relative positions of fingerprinting and DNA seem to have reversed. DNA typing has become much
more widely trusted than it was a few short years ago. Meanwhile, longstanding fissures in the
reliability of fingerprint identification have become visible cracks." Cole, supra note 20, at 5.
192. Plaza II, transcript of hearing Feb. 25, 2002, at 42.
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incriminating prints, is not as sound an argument when applied to the
defense's case. Would defenders really embrace the impending outcome of
their current request for exclusion? The result would permit defendants to
be found guilty even if the fingerprint identification evidence could clearly
prove the accused's innocence. It would be contradictory to due process,
fair play, and justice to allow a conviction to stand when exculpatory
forensic evidence exists that would vitiate the jury's guilty verdict.
The strength of the Daubert-Kumho analysis is that it seeks to
determine reliability of the expert's proffered opinion irrespective of the
expert's actual finding, whether positive or negative. 93 The DaubertKumho focus is on the reliability of the underpinnings of the methodology
that leads the expert to his or her respective conclusion 94 - exclusively an
effort to weed out "junk science." Thus, if latent fingerprint evidence is
excluded as scientifically invalid and legally unreliable, it must be
excluded for all purposes and by both parties; neither the prosecution nor
the defense would be allowed to use either incriminating or exonerating
fingerprint identification evidence.
Although defense attorneys are arguing for a conservative reading
of the Daubert-Kumho standard, a liberal admissibility standard errs to the
benefit of the accused because it enables him to introduce exculpatory
evidence in his own defense. It may not be readily obvious to the lay
observer, but negative fingerprint evidence is more common than are
positive findings. In other words, even though fingerprint evidence is very
powerful and persuasive prosecution evidence, it is often not present.
Latent fingerprints are difficult to collect and typically only found on a
limited few surfaces and locations. 95 Therefore, the result of excluding
193. American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining the
Admissibility of Expert Evidence After Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 576 (1994) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 595.) ("[C]learly stated in Daubert, the focus of the trial judge's scrutiny should be on the principles
and methodology used by the expert, not on the conclusions reached ....).
194. Id. "The Supreme Court's differentiation between underlying methods and ultimate
conclusions reinforces the crucial distinction between determining admissibility of evidence under Rule
702 and determining the weight or sufficiency of evidence. By concentrating the judge's gatekeeper
role on a review of the underlying principles and methodology, the Court recognizes that competent
analysis and review of the ultimate conclusions reached and how well those conclusions follow from
the stated premises must be determined by the fact-finder after the evidence has been tested through
vigorous cross-examination and the presentation of rebuttal evidence and after it has been analyzed in
light of all ofthe evidence and according to the judge's instructions on burden of proof." Id.
195. Latent prints are generally only recoverable from certain types of hard, smooth, non-porous
surfaces. New technologies are being developed to alleviate this limitation on latent fingerprint
collection. In Australia, "[f]orensic scientists at the University of Technology, Sydney have
demonstrated that fingerprints can be successfully lifted from rough surfaces, like bricks, boosting the
effectiveness of a crime fighting weapon that is now a century old. In collaboration with the Australian
Federal Police (AFP), has thoroughly tested the effectiveness of a new generation of chemical sprays,
showing that they offer police the chance to collect evidence from surfaces not previously regarded as
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fingerprint identification evidence from criminal jury trials as unreliable
196
could easily harm defendants more often than it would help them.
If the defense argument is accepted, and a stricter and less fluid
application of Daubert-Kumho is followed by the courts, fingerprint
evidence will gain the discredited status reserved for lie detector tests and
other forms of "shaky evidence" and vanish entirely from all
courtrooms. 197 Not only would fingerprint evidence become inadmissible
viable sites for fingerprints." University of Technology Sydney, Finding Fingerprintsin the Rough
(November 23, 2003) available at http://www.uts.edu.au/new/releases/2003/November/25.html.
Scientist Katherine Flynn presented at the 17"' International Symposium on Forensic Science a paper
entitled "The Evauation of Spray Reagents for the Detection of Latent Fingerprints at the Crime
at
available
is
abstract
The
Scene."
Maria
Canadian
scientist,
http://www.forensics.edu.au/sections.php?op-=printpage&artid=128).
Viazhikova, from the Ottawa University Heart Institute, is developing techniques to extract DNA from
fingerprints. "Even if the only evidence forensic analysts can pull from a crime scene is a fingerprint
smudged beyond recognition, a new technique developed by Canadian scientists soon could harvest
enough DNA from the print to produce a genetic identity.... The novel system can extract DNA in
Charles Choi, United Press International Science News, DNA Extractablefrom
only 15 minutes.".
Fingerprints, July 31, 2003, available at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StorylD=20030730-0406004102r. Information regarding this research was presented at the American Society of Microbiology's
Nanotechnology Conference in New York City, 2003. See generally www.asm.org. Notwithstanding
new developing techniques to enhance the process of collection and examination, latent prints found in
public places, such as a convenience store or a bank, are typically extremely poor quality and usually
render inclusive of negative findings. Therefore, in the common 7-Eleven robbery, positive fingerprint
evidence is typically not introduced by the prosecution because it is unavailable. However, negative
fingerprint evidence - the insufficient latent prints that were recovered that do not match the accused,
or the complete lack of available latent prints - is introduced by the defendant to bolster his defense that
he was not the person who robbed the 7-Eleven because his prints were not found on the 7-Eleven
doors or the 7-Eleven cash register. The use of negative fingerprint evidence as defense evidence is
powerful in discrediting the eyewitness testimony. Defense attorneys are able to argue more effectively
that the 7-Eleven clerk was mistaken and unsure about the identity of the person who committed the
robbery because there is no physical evidence, no corroborating fingerprint evidence to establish the
accused's presence in the 7-Eleven on the night in question. But if the defense bar wins its request for
blanket exclusion of fingerprint evidence, these defense arguments used to refute identity would be
eliminated as unreliable.
196. In order to fully weigh this argument one must consider the juror's bias in favor of
fingerprint evidence. As mentioned early on in this Article, "everyone" knows fingerprint evidence
does not lie. Therefore, the lack of fingerprint evidence at trial may lead a juror to speculate (although
improperly) that the prosecution has no evidence linking the accused to the crime. This inference,
although outside the facts a juror is allowed to consider, may ultimately benefit the accused by leading
the juror to believe that the prosecution's case is weaker because it lacks corroboration.
197. Although polygraph evidence was previously per se excludable from all criminal trials,
Daubert has changed the status of the admissibility of this type of evidence. In 1997, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals opined that lie detector expert witnesses are subject to the same analysis under the
Daubert test - further finding that lie detector evidence is not per se inadmissible and is otherwise
within the discretion of the trial judge. See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997).
Some jurisdictions have legislated this issue and enacted statutes that permit the admission of lie
detector evidence. See e.g., NMRA Rule 11-707(c)(New Mexico's Rules of Evidence allow for the
admission of polygraph evidence: "Subject to the provisions of these rules, the opinion of a polygraph
examiner may in the discretion of the trial judge be admitted as evidence as to the truthfulness of any
person called as a witness if the examination was performed by a person who is qualified as an expert
polygraph examiner pursuant to the provisions of this rule."). Subsequently, in a case arising from the
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through expert witnesses, but the mere mention of its existence would also
be prejudicial and could result in reversible error. This result would be
unfortunate. The exclusion of fingerprint evidence would create broad and
1 98
sweeping implications that reach beyond the criminal justice system;
further, its exclusion would not match the spirit of Daubert-Kumho, which
is intended to be more inclusive, not more restrictive.' 99 Moreover, the due
process rights of the accused may be curtailed in essence by restricting the
defense theories available to prove innocence.
V.

Deus Ex Machina: 200 Resolving the Evidentiary Dilemma of
Using Fingerprint Identification Evidence In Criminal Jury Trials

Criminal jury trials are a substantial undertaking. They are serious,
not only for the liberty interests of the accused, but also for the safety
interests of the community. For those reasons, the prosecution's burden of
military courts, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the military court's per se rule against the
admissibility of lie detector evidence does not violate a defendant's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
198. It is contradictory to apply the exclusionary rule to fingerprint identification evidence based
on an underlying analysis that it is unscientific and unreliable, notwithstanding its universal use in
many other important non-judicial purposes. For example, fingerprint experts conducted numerous
comparisons while working with New York City mortuaries following the World Trade Center tragedy.
For a description of the examiner's efforts, see "Alumnus Spotlight: Alumnus Assists at the World
Trade Center" at http://www.wscc.cc.tn.us/foundation/publicinfo/hubweb/hubll -01/spotlight.htm.
Additionally, advocates for the child registry database aimed at fighting against child abduction
encourage parents to photograph and fingerprint their children as part of a DNA kit for kids to be used
for investigation and identification purposes in the unfortunate event the child is reported missing. See,
e.g., "Kids DNA Tracing" at http://www.kids-dna.com (selling home DNA products for parents to
collect samples from their children, including a home fingerprinting kit). Fingerprinting is routinely
used as a security measure to verify identity in heightened security situations. See, e.g., Andrew
Buncombe, Rings of Steel, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Jan. 15, 2002 (describing the use of
fingerprinting as a heightened security measure at the 2002 Winter Olympics. Specifically, biometric
scanners were used to match fingerprints and limit access in the highest security areas.).
199. Also, exclusion is similarly inconsistent with the FRE and the Advisory Comments that
accompanied the post-Daubert amendment of FRE 702. See generally American College of Trial
Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Evidence After
Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571 (1994).
200. Deus ex Machina is a Latin phrase loosely meaning something that provides a sudden and
unexpected solution to a difficulty. See Merriam Webster Online, available at http://www.merriamwebster.com. Daubert, 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (The court entitles section II.B. of its opinion Deus ex
Machina referring to the difficult task judges, as legal experts, have when attempting to properly apply
the Daubert factors to technical scientific testimony. This section of the opinion emphasizes, however,
albeit difficult, judges, as "gatekeepers," must reconcile the issues of scientific validity and legal
reliability for expert witnesses testimony. The court stated: "How do we figure out whether scientists
have derived their findings through the scientific method or whether their testimony is based on
scientifically valid principles? Each expert proffered by the plaintiffs assures us that he has "utiliz[ed]
the type of data that is generally and reasonably relied upon by scientists" in the relevant field, (citation
omitted) and that he has "utilized the methods and methodology that would generally and reasonably be
accepted" by people who deal in these matters (citation omitted).").
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proving the charges beyond a reasonable doubt is a sizeable task and
should not be undermined by semantics or distracting defense tactics aimed
at confusing or tricking the jury. In cases where identity is a key issue and
fingerprint identification evidence is present, however, both parties should
be given an opportunity to fully present their respective theories to the jury.
In addition to each litigant's case being fairly presented to the jury,
consistency is another issue that should be considered. Each litigant should
also have a degree of certainty regarding the probable outcome of
evidentiary motions challenging customary evidence such as fingerprint
identification evidence. 20 ' The solutions discussed in this section are
geared toward maintaining the admissibility of fingerprint identification
evidence while still protecting both the defendant's and the prosecution's
right to a fair trial. In order to preserve this fair trial right in every criminal
case, the defendant must be provided a full opportunity to challenge the
evidence against him, while, at the same time, preserving the prosecution's
right to present the full force of its evidence. It is a balance that judges
constantly confront with every filed motion and/or contemporaneous
courtroom objection. Nonetheless, each defendant has a due process right
to defend himself and present all relevant theories of his case. This
includes the ability to attack the strength of the incriminating physical
evidence, even fingerprint identification evidence. Particularly when the
defense's argument is pure innocence, e.g., "it was not me, you've got the
wrong man," a defendant should be allowed to present the possibility of a
misidentification error by the fingerprint examiner. 2° 2 A real concern with
201. Certainty of results, i.e., the ability for attorneys to accurately predict outcomes, is very
acute in criminal law wherein ninety percent of defendants plead guilty. In order to properly assess the
fairness of the plea bargains, both the prosecution and the defense need to be able to accurately predict
the probable outcome of key evidentiary rulings. Without a firm knowledge of whether the fingerprint
identification evidence will be admitted or excluded, defense attorneys cannot properly advise their
clients whether to plead guilty or risk the outcome of a jury trial. Arguably, a defendant could reject an
early plea negotiation in order to attack the fingerprint evidence in an in limine motion. However, the
earliest plea offers are typically the most favorable to defendants, and the prosecution would likely
withdraw these favorable negotiations once the defendant began to file evidentiary motions and
rigorously challenge the evidence. The "discount" given by prosecutors in plea negotiations is largely
based upon the amount of time, effort, and government resources that have been expended on the case.
Once "full litigation" of the issues begins, the prosecutor's settlement offer automatically goes up.
Defendants should not have to risk this chance on standard evidence like fingerprints.
202. This reality highlights the significance and shear uniqueness of Detective McKie's case,
wherein because of her status as a police officer and the belief that she was not involved in the murder,
she was able to challenge the false fingerprint evidence against her in a completely different way. The
average accused is nearly unable to present even the possibility of error, let alone actually prove the
examiner made a mistake. If Detective McKie was the victim of a misidentified fingerprint, it is
possible that an innocent defendant could fall prey to the same mistake. He or she should be entitled to
present the evidence to support the theory of mistake. See generally United States v. Mitchell, 365
F.3d at 246 (Not only are extensive Daubert hearings unusual in criminal cases, they are not
required. "None of this [the Third Circuit's Mitchell opinion], however, should be read to require
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the admission of fingerprint identification evidence in jury trials lies in the
defendant's due process right to present counter-evidence or expose the
possibility that the perceived infallibility of fingerprint evidence may be
wrong. More often than not, however, defendants are not able to
effectively attack the fingerprint evidence.
Even though the conclusive opinions of fingerprint experts remain
quite vulnerable to pointed criticism in legal scholarship and vigorous
cross-examination in trial, federal trial judges' rulings conclude that
complete exclusion overstates the weakness of the evidence and is a
harsher remedy than the rules require. Right, wrong, or indifferent,
fingerprint identification evidence is not going anywhere, and defenders
must be prepared to effectively expose its limitations in front of the jury.
In this regard, many trial judges have allowed defense attorneys great
latitude in cross-examination, and even permitted defense counter-experts
to testify as rebuttal to the prosecution's experts.
For example, in United States v. Mitchell,203 after the Daubert
hearing was conducted, the trial judge orally ruled from the bench "that the
fingerprint expert testimony was admissible, that its probative value
outweighed its prejudicial impact, and that the defense was prohibited from
presenting witnesses to the jury who would testify about the general flaws
in fingerprint identification., 20 4 However, in an opposite example, an
appellate court stated that "to the extent that [the defendant] questions the
[scientific] validity of the fingerprint comparison, this is a question of
weight and credibility that properly [goes] to the jury. 20 5 Thus, currently,

extensive Daubert hearings in every case involving latent fingerprint evidence. The Supreme
Court has emphasized that district courts "have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test
an expert's reliability" as they do in deciding "whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is
reliable." Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Thus a district court would not abuse its
discretion by limiting, in a proper case, the scope of a Daubert hearing to novel challenges to the
admissibility of latent fingerprint identification evidence - or even dispensing with the hearing
altogether if no novel challenge was raised.").
203. 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002), aff'd, United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 251
(3d Cir. 2004) (The appeals court affirmed the district court's exclusion of Defendant Mitchell's
defense experts. However, the appeals court suggested a method by which these defense experts
may have been permitted to testify: "Mitchell could have asked the Court whether Prof. Starrs
and Dr. Cole would be permitted to testify as to the reliability of fingerprint identification,
provided that they did not opine on the irrelevant issue of whether it [latent fingerprint
identification], was a science. Instead he [Mitchell] accepted their exclusion. Mitchell could
have proffered the subject matter of testimony he would like to present. Instead he proffered the
witnesses he would like to call. Mitchell could have attempted to put his witnesses on the stand
to preserve his objections. Instead, they never appeared at trial." Id.).
204. 1d.See also FAIGMAN, supra note 2, §27-1.2, at 359.
205. United States v. Malveaux, 2000 WL 125917, n.5 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished). See also
FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at §27-1.2.
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courts are inconsistent regarding a defendant's right to affirmatively
challenge the fingerprint identification evidence during trial.20 6 This
inconsistency should be eliminated.
This Article suggests an alternative vehicle by which an accused
can challenge the fingerprint evidence against him - the special jury
instruction. 22007 In a balanced manner, the special jury instruction would
address the possibility of fingerprint examiner error by providing the jurors
with a list of relevant factors to consider when weighing the fingerprint
evidence presented in their particular case. The instruction(s) would not be
given in every case involving fingerprint evidence, but could be requested
by the defense in cases in which the main incriminating evidence was
fingerprint identification evidence and the defense was innocence.20 8 Two
special jury instructions are proposed. The first instruction would clarify
for the jury that a latent fingerprint expert's testimony is opinion, and not
fact. For example, the language of the proposed instruction would include
the following:

206. Notably any defense challenge would be subject to FRE Rule 403 and would have to be
more probative than prejudicial before it could be admitted. Further, the court would have to deem the
counter-evidence more than a distraction or a waste of time. Unfortunately for the defendant, since the
reliability of fingerprint evidence is ingrained into the minds of judges, many judges would reject the
defendant's request as violating FRE Rule 403 and a waste of time. Therefore, another trial practice
change that is proposed by this Article is to require a specific showing by the defense that the
fingerprint identification evidence is the prosecution's key evidence of guilt. This is a procedural
safeguard aimed at FRE Rule 403 concerns that the jury not be distracted or confused by non-material
issues.
207. Scholars ofjury bias have written on the issue of over- and under-weighing of evidence by
the jury. The "battle of the experts" is a situation in which this type of jury bias can commonly occur.
Specifically, in trials where litigants have experts fighting over which opinion is more correct, jurors
either simply ignore both experts and only focus on the other evidence in the case, or alternatively
ignore all the other evidence in the case and only consider the opinion testimony of the experts. Both,
over- and under-weighing of important criminal evidence, especially fingerprint evidence which points
to identity, injects a problem of jury bias for both litigants. The jury instruction method helps to
alleviate the inherent prejudicial effect of the "battle of the experts" while simultaneously affording
every defendant, even those who cannot afford to hire an independent defense expert, the opportunity to
challenge the validity of the fingerprint identification evidence.
208. It is important to narrowly limit when the instruction can be given in order to prevent unduly
distracting the jury with irrelevant side issues. For example, in a case where the crime was allegedly
committed in the defendant's residence, attacking the existence of the latent fingerprints found in the
defendant's bedroom would not be appropriate. The special jury instruction should not be given in this
situation because the existence of the accused fingerprints is not an essential part of the prosecution's
evidence of guilt. Additionally, the defense case would be required to be actual innocence. For
example, in a murder case, the defendant would have to argue that he did not kill the victim, like
Asbury argued in the Scotland case. See supra note 67. The special jury instruction regarding examiner
error would not be allowed in a case where the defendant was arguing his level of mens rea, i.e.,
manslaughter instead of murder. In such a case, the special jury instruction would be more of a
hindrance than a help and would instead distract the jury from the true issues in the case.
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The latent fingerprint expert's testimony is his or her
professional opinion. It should not be considered by you as a
conclusive fact, but should be weighed along with all the
evidence that you have heard in this case. Testimony from a
latent fingerprint expert is not conclusive, in itself, on the
issue of guilt; instead, guilt must be proven in light of all the
evidence. As jurors, you are the ultimate fact finder and may
give the fingerprint evidence whatever weight you determine
is appropriate.
The second proposed jury instruction would address how much
weight to give the testimony of the latent fingerprint expert. Although an
expert's opinion may often warrant being given a great deal of weight, an
expert's opinion is not automatically more important than other physical or
testimonial evidence admitted in the case. Due to the identified biases and
misconceptions that fingerprint evidence is infallible, it is particularly
important to give jurors some guidance, in the way of an instruction,
regarding how to analyze the value of the fingerprint evidence admitted in
the particular criminal case before them to consider. Therefore, instead of
applying an automatic or unreasoned meaning to the fingerprint evidence,
e.g., fingerprint match = defendant is guilty, this instruction encourages
jurors to think critically about the quality of the physical evidence as well
as the competence of the expert examining it. Entitled, "Factors Jurors
May Use To Determine The Credibility Or Reliability Of The Particular
Testifying Latent Fingerprint Expert," the second instruction would state:
In weighing the credibility of a latent fingerprint
examiner, you may consider the following factors: a) the
experience, training, and expertise of the examiner; b) the
number of similar fingerprint ridge characteristics found among
the latent and known print(s); c) whether there are dissimilar
fingerprint ridge characteristics found among the latent and
known print(s); d) the size of the latent print(s) relied on; e) the
quality and clarity of the latent print(s) relied on.209

209. See Regina v. Buckley, 143 SJ LB 159 (April 30, 1999). Buckley is a case from the United
Kingdom, and at the time of the Plaza I1 decision, it was the seminal case on the issue of the
admissibility and reliability of fingerprint identification evidence. In Buckley, the Court of Appeal
(Criminal Division) described the history of fingerprinting which originated in England and explained
the evolution of the standards for analyzing fingerprints established by the National Conference of
Fingerprint Experts. Beginning in 2000, the standard changed from requiring a set number of points of
similarity to a standard which mirrors the standard utilized by the FBI, which does not require a certain
number of points in order for the expert to render an opinion regarding identity. Therefore, in an effort
to give some guidance to the trial courts, the Buckley court held that in cases where the latent
fingerprint expert's opinion was based on fewer than eight "similar ridge characteristics," the
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The instruction could be adjusted by the trial court to appropriately
fit the facts of the case, and should, for example, state only the
contaminates which were established in evidence during trial. These could
include such issues as, consideration of possible injury to the person who
left the print, as well as actual physical contaminates like other overlying
fingerprints, dirt or blood. Not all cases will present the same issues
regarding quality and clarity of the latent print, and the proposed
instruction should be expanded or redacted accordingly, as not to inject
undue prejudice or confusion into the jury's determination.
As the reference notes indicate, the United Kingdom, in Regina v.
Buckley, has espoused these credibility factors for fingerprint identification
evidence and instructed the trial judge, as a question of law, to weigh them
in determining the legal question of admissibility in a particular case. My
proposal echoes the Buckley court regarding the relevant factors that must
be weighed but instead advocates that the jury consider them as a question
of fact. Consistent with the current liberal admissibility interpretation of
the Daubert-Kumho standard that the U.S. appellate courts have applied,
there is no real debate whether, as a legal question, fingerprint evidence is
admissible. It clearly is. Nevertheless, it is arguable by both prosecution
and defense whether all fingerprint evidence is equal and whether the
quality of the analysis of every expert is reliable - factual questions for
each juror to weigh along with all the other evidence. Although trial
judges possess the discretionary authority to exclude fingerprint
identification evidence that falls below the standard of legal reliability, as
of the writing of the Article there is no corresponding binding authority in
American law, akin to Buckley, that would require a judge to exclude
fingerprint identification evidence that fell bellow a certain number of
ridge comparison points. The use of the Buckley factors in special jury

fingerprint identification evidence should not be admitted by the prosecution; however, in cases where
the latent fingerprint expert's opinion is based on "eight or more similar ridge characteristics, a judge
may or may not exercise his or her discretion in favour [sic] of admitting the evidence." The Buckley
court went on to list the elements that the trial judge should consider when performing the gatekeeping
function to admit or deny the admission of fingerprint identification evidence. As excerpted in PlazaII,
the following factors were listed: "(i) the experience and expertise of the witness; (ii) the number of
similar ridge characteristics; (iii) whether there are dissimilar characteristics; (iv) the size of the print
relied on, in that the same number of similar ridge characteristics may be more compelling in a
fragment of print than in an entire print; and (v) the quality and clarity of the print on the item relied on,
which may involve, for example, consideration of possible injury to the person who left the print, as
well as factors as smearing or contamination. In every case where fingerprint evidence is admitted, it
will generally be necessary, as in relation to all expert evidence, for the judge to warn the jury that it is
evidence opinion only, that the expert's opinion is not conclusive and that it is for the jury to determine
whether guilt is proved in the light of all the evidence." Plaza11, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67.
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instructions, however, gives guidance to jurors regarding how to evaluate
the evidentiary worth of fingerprint evidence and credibility of the specific
expert witnesses testifying regarding it.
Although not previously used for fingerprints, there is precedent in
American courts for instructing jurors specifically about certain testimonial
evidence, intentionally giving jurors guidance on how to evaluate it and the
appropriate weight to give it; consider the special jury instructions given in
cases wherein eyewitness identification testimony is the prosecution's
primary incriminating evidence.
The eyewitness identification example is comparable to the
fingerprint identification issues in one important aspect: the information
contained in the defense special instruction is in direct contradiction to the
prosecution's theory of the case and is counter-intuitive to assumptions that
the average layperson juror would make about the evidence. In other
words, in the eyewitness context, the lay juror is more likely to believe a
victim who is absolutely sure about the identity of her attacker over a
victim who testifies less adamantly regarding identity. Yet, scientific
studies of eyewitnesses' ability to correctly identify their true attacker
support the opposite conclusion, and the victim who testifies that she is
"100% sure" about identity is no more often correct about the identity of
her true assailant than the victim who testifies less adamantly. Therefore,
the knowledge of this empirical fact, in the form of framework evidence
contained in a special jury instruction, helps the jury to properly assess the
victim's credibility and not overweigh her eyewitness identification
testimony simply because she says she is 100% sure.
With fingerprint evidence, it is similarly counter-intuitive to
believe that the fingerprints could "lie." There is, however, no scientific
support for the theory that fingerprint evidence is infallible, and if courts
are going to continue to interpret the Daubert-Kumho standard liberally,
the defense should be entitled to present framework evidence, in the form
of a special jury instruction, to allow jurors to appropriately weigh the
value of the fingerprint evidence which includes the possibility of
disregarding it as unpersuasive in a particular case or even possibly
erroneous; a thought that they would otherwise reject as impossible.
Courts have recognized the use of the jury instruction method to
opinion evidence. In State v. Alger,210 the Court of Appeals
expert
present
of Idaho noted the Arizona Supreme Court's use of jury instructions to
inform the jury regarding potential eyewitness identification errors:

210. 764 P.2d 119 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988).
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Our conclusion is consistent with recent decisions of
other state courts that have considered [the use of eyewitness
identification jury instructions]. In State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d
1208 (Ariz. 1983)(en bane), the Arizona Supreme Court held
that even if jurors of ordinary education need no expert
testimony to enlighten them on the dangers inherent in
eyewitness identification, expert testimony on the issue
nonetheless would be admissible to support a defense of
misidentification.
The Court reasoned that the concepts
developed through the expert's research would be of substantial
assistance to the jury. This trend is reflected by decisions of
other courts mandating the use of jury instructions warning the
jury of the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification. See,
e.g., State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 399 N.E.2d 482
(1980); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); State v. Payne,
167 W.Va. 252, 280 S.E.2d 72 (1981).211

The use of the jury instruction method, instead of presenting a
counter-expert in the defense's case, is preferable for two reasons: 1) it
affords every defendant, regardless of financial resources available to hire
counter-expert witnesses, the ability to present and argue the issue of
potential examiner error before the jury; and 2) it avoids the "battle of the
experts" circus during trial which often results in the jury overweighing or
underweighing the piece of evidence the experts are fighting over. With
the jury instruction method, the judge can tailor the appropriate instruction
to fit the status of the law and science at the time of the trial as well as the
relevant facts of the case. The parties are provided an opportunity, outside
the presence of the jury, to argue and make a record of specific objections
to the instruction in order to properly preserve issues for appeal. Further,
the jury instruction would only be providing "framework" evidence, not
adjudicative fact, and as such is less persuasive and creates less prejudicial
effect on the prosecution's case. The jury would merely be exposed to the
knowledge that misidentification is reasonable given the quality of the
fingerprint evidence and all the other relevant evidence in the case.
The caveat to the jury instruction method is that only theories that
are well-settled should be instructed in this fashion.' 2 12 John Monahan and
211. Id. at 127.
212. Therefore, it must be first determined by the trial court that the defense's argument attacking
the validity of fingerprint identification is valid, i.e., the defense must proffer evidentiary support for
this argument. In the case of fingerprint identification, this step in the analysis is a bit oxymoronic
because fingerprints allegedly have not met the showing of scientific validity required by DaubertKumho; thus to force the opponent to meet a standard for its theory that the proponent cannot meet
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Laurens Walker, two of the leading experts in the use of social science in
law and advocates of the jury instruction method, explained it this way:
The question.., is what courts should do when a party
requests "social framework" instructions but presents no social
science research, or only inadequate social science research, to
support the request. The answer is to be found by turning to the
standard for framing jury instructions. That standard is clear:
courts must give only instructions that state the law "correctly"
or "accurately.". . . If the research comprising the framework is

valid in the court's estimation, and relevant to the facts of the
case, the instruction should be given. If the research is invalid,
or nonexistent, it would follow from the law regarding jury
instructions that no instruction would be forthcoming. An
instruction would be unnecessary to decide the case: lacking
valid research, a jury is as well equipped as a judge to speculate
on the effect of social context in determining the facts at issue in
the case.2t3
Therefore, the instruction proposed in this section lists established and
relevant factors used to evaluate fingerprint identification evidence factors which either make the evidence stronger or weaker in a particular
case. However, it is foreseeable, as more becomes known about the
"science" of fingerprinting, that future special jury instructions could
include more details about the strength or limitation of the evidence. In
any event, it would be a legal question for the judge to determine whether
the counter-evidence claiming the inaccuracy of fingerprint indentification
evidence was reliable, i.e., "accurate," enough to support giving such an
instruction. On balance, the jury instruction method favors the defendant's
right to fair trial in that it would allow every defendant to assert the theory
of fingerprint misidentification in relevant cases where fingerprint evidence
is the main incriminating evidence.

seems backward. Proponents of fingerprint identification evidence argue that merely exposing the fact
that fingerprint examiners make mistakes or that their accuracy has not been empirically studied does
not establish lack of scientific validity or that their expert opinions are not based on "good grounds."
213. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers, 183
Wis. L. REV. 569, 592 (1991).
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VI.

Conclusion

The pas de deux2 14 between the defense and the prosecution on this
issue is a necessary exercise, and essential to the operation of the
adversarial system that strives to seek justice. Akin to the checks and
balances in the United States' tripartite democracy, the soundness and
reliability of the rulings and verdicts handed down from the judicial branch
is essential to the stability and health of the democratic system of
government.
Currently fingerprint analysis is under attack because of the lack of
study done on the accuracy of the examiners coupled with the
unwillingness or inability of the forensic science community to detect,
acknowledge, and correct mistakes. Another weakness lies in the fact that
fingerprint identification is an industry of analysis conducted with an eye
towards litigation and is monopolized by law enforcement. This lopsided
division of labor would not be such a concern if latent fingerprint
examiners were also independently checked, monitored, or regulated. But
instead it is all self-contained: investigation, production or analysis of
evidence, and prosecution. It leads to dangerous suspicions and produces
realities like Detective McKie's.
The issue of fingerprint identification is more complex because of
the uniqueness and permanence of fingerprints themselves and the history
of universal acceptance this type of evidence has enjoyed.
Notwithstanding the human and subjective elements of fingerprint analysis,
which inevitably creates errors, courts have mechanically relied on these
test results for nearly one hundred years. The Daubert-Kumho standard
now forces courts to scrutinize expert opinion testimony, including
fingerprint identification experts, to a heightened degree.
Expert fingerprint examiner Pat Wertheim summed up the real fear
with fingerprint identification evidence and why the certainty of its
reliability is crucial. In his interview with BBC's Frontline, he stated: "In
a free society a person has the right to be confronted in court only with
valid evidence. If we allow the police to introduce bogus evidence in the
court then we become a police state.''2 15 Therefore, without proper
methodology and testing and ways to identify errors, a prosecutor will
never know if she is convicting David Asbury or the real killer. It is too
serious of a question at which to guess. The evidence used in criminal
214. Pas de deux is a Latin phrase which is defined as "an intricate relationship or activity
involving two parties or things." See Merriam Webster Online, available at http://www.meriamwebster.com.
215. FrontlineMay 2000, supra note 67.
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cases must be scientifically valid and legally reliable.
Faigman's treatise, Modern Scientific Evidence, predicts the future

landscape for this area of law:
One likely and beneficial scenario would be that the
belated empirical research sparked by the fingerprint
community's fear of exclusion under Daubert and Kumho Tire
will result in knowledge that will lead courts not to exclude but
to require fingerprint identification expert witnesses to remain
within the bounds of those data, to become aware of and be
candid about the field's limitations, and to refrain from making
unsupportable exaggerations - some
21 6 of which virtually define
the field in the popular imagination.
Empirical testing of the validity of latent fingerprint identification
evidence can only help the justice system, not hurt it. Frankly, it is
somewhat shocking that in 2004 the hard data does not already exist to
support the general belief that fingerprints do not lie.

216. Faigman et al, supranote 2, §27-1.0, at 350.

